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THE FUGITIVE IN NEW YORK:
CAN LAW ENFORCEMENT CROSS STATE LINES
AND ACT UNDER COLOR OF ITS OFFICE?*
HON. FREDERIC S. BERMAN'
I.

& JAY M. LIPPMAN'

INTRODUCTION

For some in New York State, it could be said that 1993 was the year
of "The Fugitive." In the summer of 1993, millions of movie viewers
flocked to see The Fugitive, which starred Harrison Ford as Doctor
Richard Kimble, everyone's favorite murder suspect on the lam.
1993 was also the "Year of the Fugitive" for a New York State
Supreme Court trial court. That court considered a question that was novel
to New York jurisprudence: may a police officer from a foreign state, not
in hot pursuit of a suspect sought by such state, arrest that person on New
York State soil?
The case in which this issue was raised was People v. La Fontaine,1
in which the trial court upheld an arrest in New York City by Paterson,
New Jersey officers, not in close pursuit, pursuant to a federal arrest
warrant.' Specifically, the La Fontaine court applied the "under color of
authority" doctrine first promulgated in a Florida decision, Collins v.
State,3 and held that foreign state police officers, not in close pursuit,
who "invoke the 'color or indicia' of their office to effect an
extrajurisdictional arrest in New York State" are to be treated as police
* The authors wish to express their appreciation to Bonnie Erdheim, a recent
graduate of New York Law School, who served as an intern to Justice Berman, for her
assistance in the preparation of this article.
** Acting Supreme Court Justice, New York County; Adjunct Professor of Law,
New York Law School.
*** B.A., Columbia University, 1983; J.D., State University of New York at
Buffalo, 1987.
1. 603 N.Y.S.2d 660 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993).
2. Id.
3. 143 So. 2d 700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962), cert. denied, 148 So. 2d 280 (Fla.
1962) (holding that officers acting outside their jurisdiction and under "color of
authority" must have a valid legal basis to enter a motel room); see also Phoenix v.
State, 428 So. 2d 262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 455 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1984)
(limiting the "under color of authority" doctrine to extrajurisdictional pre-arrest
investigations or acquisitions of evidence); State v. Filipi, 297 N.W.2d 275 (Minn.
1980)(agreeing with rule promulgated by Phoenix, but holding that a post-arrest search
conducted by officers outside their jurisdiction and acting "under color of authority" fell
within the scope of the Fourth Amendment).
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officers under the Fourth Amendment. 4 Consequently, the court held the
officers' conduct fell within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment and the
exclusionary rule.5
This article will first discuss La Fontaine and examine how other
states have addressed extraterritorial arrests. 6 Second, the article will
examine the history of the "under color of authority" doctrine and its
variations.7 Finally, this principle will be recommended to New York
courts to resolve issues akin to the one before the La Fontaine court. 8
It should be noted that the issue under consideration does not pertain
to foreign state police officers who are designated by the governor of New
York to effect an arrest pursuant to a formal extradition requisition from
a sister state, nor to foreign state officers who are in close pursuit of
suspects in New York, nor to sister state officers acting as agents of police
officers from any law enforcement agency empowered by New York law.9
4. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
5. Id.
6. See infra Parts II-IV. Although many of these cases entail extrajurisdictional
arrests made by police officers within one state, they are equally applicable to interstate
extraterritorial arrests such as the one presented in La Fontaine. Although this article will
discuss cases which apply to intrastate extrajurisdictional arrests, its sole concern will be
with arrests conducted by officers from State A on the soil of State B. Also, for purposes
of this article, jurisdiction pertains to territories, including but not limited to townships,
villages, municipalities, cities, counties, and states.
7. See infra Part V.
8. See infra Part VI.
9. This article does not address arrests made pursuant to the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act. (N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 570 (McKinney 1984). However, one
provision under the Uniform Extradition Act may be applicable. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 570.34 (McKinney 1984):
The arrest of a person in this state may be lawfully made also by any police
officer or private person, without a warrant, upon reasonable information that
the accused stands charged in the courts of another state with a crime
punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year....
Id.
For purposes of this article the statute is deemed not controlling because it does not
expressly provide a remedy for its violations, and because in New York state suppression
motions are brought under the Fourth Amendment and the New York State Constitution
(N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12), which both provide the remedy of evidence exclusion. See
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies
to violations of the Fourth Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding
that under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment the exclusionary rule
applies to violations of the Fourth Amendment allegedly committed by state law
enforcement agents); People v. P.J. Video, 501 N.E.2d 556, 561 n.4 (N.Y. 1986)
(recognizing the common history of the Fourth Amendment and New York State's
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II. LA FONTAINE
A. Case Facts
On November 18, 1992, four New Jersey police officers came into
Manhattan to arrest Sixto La Fontaine.' ° La Fontaine was wanted by a
New Jersey state court for committing the felonies of conspiracy to
murder and aggravated assault on August 16, 1992." In addition, he was
wanted by a federal district court sitting in Newark, New Jersey for
crossing the New Jersey-New York State line on August 21, 1992 to avoid
prosecution for the conspiracy to murder charge.' 2 This offense is a
felony under federal law.13 Prior to November 18, 1992, both a New
parallel provision, N.Y. CONST. art. I, §12, and implying that, after Mapp was decided,
the exclusionary rule was applied in the same manner with respect to the Fourth
Amendment and N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 12); Sackler v. Sackler, 203 N.E.2d 281 (N.Y.
1964) (implying that N.Y. CONST. art I, § 12 applies only to the government and its
agents); cf. cases cited infra notes 39-41. Also, this provision may not be applicable to
scenarios which involve arrests in the home and which mandate the acquisition of a
warrant. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
See also N.Y. CRim. PRoc. LAW § 570 (McKinney 1984) (Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 140.55 (McKinney 1984) (Uniform Close

Pursuit act); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 1.20 (defining terms of general use in the
Criminal Procedure Law) (McKinney 1970); Burdeau v. McDowell, 265 U.S. 465
(1921)(holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to activities of private citizens
and applies to government officials only).
Fresh or close pursuit has been construed as meaning "the continuous and
uninterrupted pursuit of a suspect with unnecessary delay after the commission of an
offense," People v. Lindsey, 805 P.2d 1134 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, 1991
Colo. LEXIS 137 (Colo. Mar. 11, 1991), overruled on other grounds by People v.
Milton, 864 P.2d 1097 (Cob. 1993) (en bane), or that the pursuit must be immediate
or continuous, State v. Cochran, 372 A.2d 193, 196 (Del. 1977), or pursuit without
unreasonable delay, State v. Steinbrun, 774 P.2d 55 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (construing
Washington's close pursuit statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 10.89.050 (1990)).
Finally, this article will not discuss arrests and seizures of evidence effected by
police officers from other nations.
10. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
11. Id. n.1; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-4(a) (1982) (grading of . . .
conspiracy); id. § 2C:11-3(b) (1982) (murder); id. § 2C:12-1(b)(1) (aggravated assault).
12. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 662 n.2; see 18 U.S.C § 1073 (1989) (flight to
avoid prosecution or giving of testimony).
13. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 662 n.2; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1073, 3559 (1989)
(Section 1073 is a class E felony for which an offender thereunder may be sentenced to
a term of imprisonment not to exceed five years.).
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Jersey state court and a federal district court sitting in Newark, New
Jersey had issued warrants for La Fontaine's arrest.14
Upon entering New York City, the New Jersey detectives enlisted the

assistance of detectives from the New York City Police Department's 34th
Precinct in an effort to locate La Fontaine in a street canvass."5

The

canvass proved to be fruitless. 16 Thereafter, without any help from their

New York City counterparts, the New Jersey officers continued their quest

for La Fontaine and
eventually seized him on a fire escape landing outside
17

of his apartment.
After La Fontaine's apprehension, the New Jersey officers took him
into his apartment, where one officer administered to him his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona.'8 From the apartment, that same officer recovered
cocaine and alleged narcotics paraphernalia, which, the officer contended,
were in plain view. 9
Eventually, the New Jersey police surrendered La Fontaine and the
seized contraband to the 34th Precinct.' There, in the presence of police
from the 34th Precinct, one of the New Jersey officers re-administered to
La Fontaine his "Miranda" warnings, after which La Fontaine admitted
to possessing the cocaine. 2 Ultimately, a New York grand jury indicted
14. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 663. Upon arriving in the area immediately outside La Fontaine's
apartment, the New Jersey detectives knocked on his door, and identified themselves as
the police. Id. This action induced La Fontaine to flee from his apartment onto a fire
escape which was outside of the apartment. Id. In light of this action, the La Fontaine
court held that La Fontaine was constructively arrested in his apartment. Id. at 668.
18. Id.; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring that, pursuant to
the Fifth Amendment, governmental officials, prior to conducting any custodial
interrogation, must advise a suspect that he has the right to remain silent, that anything
he states may be used against him, that he has a right to consult with a lawyer and have
an attorney present during the questioning, and that he has the right to have counsel
provided if unable to afford one); see also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding
that the Fifth Amendment is binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
19. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 663; see also Suppress Hr'g Record at 11, 39-42,
People v. Sixto La Fontaine, (No. 11964/92). The narcotics paraphernalia seized
consisted of plastic baggies of cocaine and a heater seal, which is frequently utilized in
the narcotics trade to seal plastic baggies. 603 N.Y.S.2d at 663; see also cases cited
infra note 55.
20. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 663.
21. Suppress Hr'g Record at 12-14.

1994]

ThE FUGITIVE IN NEW YORK

La Fontaine for illegal possession of narcotics under New York law. 2
New York City police officers did not participate in La Fontaine's arrest
or in the seizure of the contraband.'
During the course of the litigation, La Fontaine's attorney moved to
suppress the contraband and the confession as products of an unlawful
After the
arrest.' The trial court conducted a suppression hearing.'
hearing, La Fontaine argued that the New Jersey officers had no authority
to arrest him outside of New Jersey, which rendered his apprehension
unlawful.'
In opposition to La Fontaine's motion to suppress, the
government contended that the New Jersey officers had the same right to
arrest La Fontaine as a private citizen has under the New York Penal Law
provision granting private citizens the right to arrest in certain
circumstances.' Additionally, averred the prosecution, the New Jersey
officers, as agents of the New York City Police Department, were entitled
to seize La Fontaine.' Both parties did acknowledge that on November
22. 603 N.Y.S. at 663. Specifically, the defendant was indicted for two counts of
criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (N.Y. PENAL LAW §
220.16(1) (McKinney 1989); id. § 220.16(12) (McKinney 1989, Supp. 1993)) and one
count of criminally using drug paraphernalia in the second degree (N.Y. PENAL LAW §
220.50 (McKinney 1971)).
23. 603 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
24. Id. at 662. This motion to suppress evidence was made pursuant to Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 613 (1961), Dunaway v. New York, 439 U.S. 979 (1978) (excluding a
confession as the product of an arrest unsupported by probable cause), and People v.
Huntley, 204 N.E.2d 179 (N.Y. 1965) (requiring that, before trial, a judge conduct a
hearing to determine the voluntariness of a statement, and, ultimately, its admissibility);
see also Suppress Hr'g Record at 2.
25. 603 N.Y.S.2d at 662. An evidence suppression hearing was conducted on March
29, 1993. Id. The only witness who testified at the hearing was Detective Ronald
Humphrey of the Paterson, New Jersey Police Department. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. See N.Y. CalM. PROC. LAW § 140.30 (McKinney 1992) (arrest without a
warrant; by any person; when and where authorized) which states:
1. Subject to the provisions of subdivision two, any person may arrest another
person (a) for a felony when the latter has in fact committed such felony, and
(b) for any offense when the latter has in fact committed such offense in his
presence.
2. Such an arrest, if for a felony, may be made anywhere in the state. If the
arrest is for an offense other than a felony, it may be made only in the county
in which such offense was committed.
Id.
28. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 662; see also supratext accompanying note 7.
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18, 1992 the New Jersey officers acted as police officers and not as
private citizens.'

B. The Decision
In a written opinion dated June 8, 1993, the suppression court ruled

that La Fontaine's arrest was valid. 0 At the outset of the decision, the

court noted that the validity of an arrest in New York State by foreign
state police officers not in close pursuit had not been addressed by any
New York authority.3 1 The court recognized that neither party contended
that the New Jersey officers were acting in close pursuit pursuant to the
Uniform Close Pursuit act of New York's Criminal Procedure Law. 2
That fact was significant because this provision is the only New York
State Criminal Procedure Provision that expressly grants sister state police

officers the right to arrest in New York. 3
The court then determined that no part of the Criminal Procedure Law

either grants or denies foreign state police officers not in close pursuit the
power to arrest in New York. 4 However, the court found authority
29. 603 N.Y.S.2d at 663.
30. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d 660.
31. 603 N.Y.S.2d at 662, 663.
32. Id. at 663. See N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 140.55 (McKinney 1981) (arrest
without a warrant; by peace officers of other states for offenses committed outside state;
uniform close pursuit act), which permits a foreign state police officer who enters New
York State in close pursuit of a suspect to arrest the suspect on the ground that she has
committed a crime in another state. Id. § 140.55(2). Such crime must be a crime under
New York law, id., and the officer must be from a state which has enacted a provision
similar to N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 140.55 (McKinney 1981). Id. § 140.55(6). In its
original opinion the court also observed that the People did not challenge La Fontaine's
Fourth Amendment standing to contest the arrest and that La Fontaine did not assert that
the New Jersey and federal arrest warrants were not based on probable cause. People v.
La Fontaine, No. 11964/92, slip op. at 9 (N.Y. Co. Sup. Ct. June 8, 1993). See Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (requiring that a defendant demonstrate standing to claim
protection under the Fourth Amendment); see, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573
(1980) (observing that an arrest warrant for a felony is based on probable cause).
33. See generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 120 (McKinney 1981) (warrant of
arrest) and N.Y. CRim. PRoc. LAW § 140 (McKinney 1981) (arrest without a warrant).
34. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 664-65. In People v. Saxton, 236 N.E.2d 640
(N.Y. 1968), without opinion, the New York State Court of Appeals affirmed a burglary
conviction involving an arrest made in Queens County by a Nassau County police officer.
Implicitly, the court accepted the People's contention that under § 8-21.0 of the Nassau
County Administrative Code (L. 1939, ch. 272 as amended) and New York State's
repealed Code of Criminal Procedure, the officer was entitled to effect the arrest, even
though he was not in hot pursuit. See 236 N.E.2d at 640-41.
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from other states and secondary authorities establishing two basic
principles: 1) a police officer has the power to arrest only within the state
which bestows such authority;35 and 2) a police officer from one state, not

in close pursuit, is authorized to apprehend a suspect in another state if a
private citizen there may do so.' The La Fontaine court was persuaded
by these authorities, and imported them to New York jurisprudence. 37
Under these principles, the New Jersey police officers had the same
authority to arrest La Fontaine as would have a private citizen under the
Criminal Procedure Law provision which bestows upon private citizens the
power to arrest.38 However, the court declined to determine the legality
of La Fontaine's arrest by applying this statute, finding that it did not
expressly impose a remedy for any violation of it. 39 Instead, the court
chose to analyze La Fontaine's claim under the Fourth Amendment which

does provide redress for its infringement, i.e, exclusion at trial of illegally
procured evidence.'
Under N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10 (1), (3) (McKinney 1992) (arrest without
a warrant; by police officer; when and where authorized), for a non-petty offense, a New
York State police officer, any where in the state, may arrest a person if he has
reasonable cause to believe such crime was perpetrated, and such officer need not be in
close pursuit of such person. Thus, this provision appears to have codified the People's
position advanced in Saxton and impliedly endorsed by New York's Court of Appeals.
35. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 665. The court relied upon 6A C.J.S. Arrest §
53(a) (1975) (Jurisdictional and Territorial Limits of Arresting Authority; a. Arrest
Outside of State of Offense); 5 AM. JuR. 2D Arrest § 50 (1962), M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
CITIzEN's ARREST (1977); State v. Slawek, 338 N.W.2d 120, 121 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983)
(recognizing that generally a police officer acting beyond her bailiwick does not have the
authority to effect arrests and that an extensive line of authorities from several states
validate an extrajurisdictional arrest as that of a private citizen if such states sanction
private citizen arrests).
36. La Fontaine,603 N.Y.S.2d at 665. The court relied upon M. BASSIOUNI, supra
note 35, 6A C.J.S., supra note 35, 5 Am. Jur. 2D, supra note 35, and Slawek, 338
N.W.2d 120. The court also cited State v. Stevens, 603 A.2d 1203, 1208
(Conn.App.1992), aff'd, 620 A.2d 789 (Conn. 1993) (recognizing that generally police
officers acting extraterritorially have the same authority to arrest as do private citizens),
and Commonwealth v. Gullick, 435 N.E.2d 348, 351 (Mass. 1982) (acknowledging that
a police officer effecting an arrest outside of her jurisdiction does so as a private citizen
and that such arrest may be deemed valid as a private citizen's arrest).
37. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
38. Id. at 665; see N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 140.30 (McKinney 1981).
39. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 665; cf. infra text accompanying notes 104-11.
40. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 665; cf. cases cited infra pp. 22-24 and notes
104-11; see also City of Kettering v. Hollen, 416 N.E.2d 598 (Ohio 1980) (ruling that
as to extrajurisdictional police conduct in violation of Ohio law, absent legislative
mandate requiring application of exclusionary rule to such violations, the rule is generally
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Second, the court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply

under the "state action" principle.4 1

The court stated that, without

evidence of New York City Police Department participation in or
awareness of La Fontaine's arrest or the seizure of the contraband, the

34th Precinct's issuance of a police radio to the New Jersey officers did
not constitute sufficient involvement by a New York State law
enforcement authority to trigger the application of this rule.42 In light of
this view, the arrest and search and seizure apparently fell beyond the
ambit of the Fourth Amendment and any constitutional attack.4
Nonetheless, the court elected to apply this amendment and the

exclusionary rule by application of the "under color of authority"
doctrine.'

Relying upon two court decisions from Florida'

and one

from Minnesota,' the court held that "any out-of-state police officer, not
in close pursuit, who invokes the 'color or authority of her office' to
inapplicable to such conduct unless violative of constitutional rights); ef. State v. Tingle,
477 N.W.2d 544 (Neb. 1991) (holding that if an extrajurisdictional arrest is unauthorized
by state statutory or common law, then such arrest is unconstitutional).
41. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 665; see Burdeau v. McDowell, 265 U.S. 465;
see also People v. Esposito, 332 N.E.2d 865 (N.Y. 1975) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment applies only to governmental officials or their agents and not to private
citizens); People v. Horman, 239 N.E.2d 625, (N.Y. 1968) (holding that the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments do not apply to evidence seized without the participation or
knowledge of the government); Sackler v. Sackler, 203 N.E.2d 481 (N.Y. 1964).
42. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 665; see Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74,
79 (1949) (finding that a Secret Service agent had participated in a search before it was
completed); accord Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 6 (9th Cir. 1966); cf. United
States v. Bennett, 709 F.2d 803, 805 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1075 (1984)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment applies to private citizen conduct if the government
is aware of it and acquiesces in it); United States v. Gumerlock, 590 F.2d 794, 800 (9th
Cir. 1979) (en bane) (ruling that a search conducted by a private citizen who harbors a
unilateral desire to aid law enforcement is not subject to Fourth Amendment coverage).
43. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 666. Also, the court noted that the New Jersey
officers' surrendering of the evidence to New York authorities did not transform the
former officers into agents of New York State. Id.; see People v. Adler, 409 N.E.2d
888, 891 (N.Y. 1980) (ruling that, under the Fourth Amendment, a private person does
not become a governmental agent merely by surrendering evidence to the police); see
also Honnan, 239 N.E.2d at 625.
44. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
45. Id. The two Florida cases cited by the court were Collins v. State, 143 So. 2d
700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1962), cert. denied, 148 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1962) and
State v. Phoenix, 428 So. 2d 262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1982), aff'd, 455 So. 2d
1024 (Fla. 1984).
46. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 666. The Minnesota case relied upon by the
court was State v. Filipi, 297 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1980).
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effect an extrajurisdictional arrest in New York State is not to be treated
as a private citizen for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis." 47 The

court noted the absence of any state or federal authority addressing the
scenario presented by the case.'

It predicated its decision to apply the

"under color of authority" test on New York State constitutional

principles49 and on a constitutional concern for the protection of
The court also desired to exclude
individual rights and liberties.'
evidence obtained by foreign state police officers in violation of federal
and state law and surrendered "on a silver platter" to their New York

State counterparts. 51
The court then applied this theory to the facts of the case and found

that the New Jersey officers utilized the authority of their office to arrest

La Fontaine and obtain the cocaine.52 Therefore, pursuant to the court's

holding, the officers' activities fell within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment and the exclusionary rule.'
47. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
48. Id. at 666.
49. Id. The court applied United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948)
(holding that in the absence of federal authority a federal suppression court must apply
the law of the state in which an arrest transpires to determine its validity) and United
States v. Swarovski, 557 F.2d 40, 43 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978)
(applying the Di Re rule).
50. LaFontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 666. The court relied upon Sharrock v. Dell
Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 379 N.E.2d 1169, 1174 (N.Y. 1978) (recognizing that the New
York State Constitution protects imperiled personal liberties regardless of from where the
danger emanates), People v. P.J. Video, 501 N.E.2d 556 (N.Y. 1986), and People v.
Harris, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 1054 (N.Y. 1991) (recognizing that the New York State Court
of Appeals has construed a discrete law of search and seizure under the New York State
Constitution apart from that embodied by the Fourth Amendment to best safeguard
individual rights).
51. LaFontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 666. The "silver platter" doctrine was abrogated
in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224 (1960). Pursuant to this doctrine, evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment by state officials not acting on behalf of
the federal government was admissible in federal trials. Id. Such evidence was deemed
to have been surrendered to federal authorities by their state counterparts "on a silver
platter." The court also cited BASSIOUNI, supra note 35, at 34.
52. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 667. The court found that the New Jersey officers
acted like police officers, and unlike private citizens, when they identified themselves as
police officers, conveyed to the defendant that they had a fugitive warrant for his arrest,
and, administered Miranda warnings. Id. at 667-68. Also, the court noted that the New
Jersey officers induced the defendant to forego the privacy in his apartment by exerting
their authority as police officers. Id.
53. Id. at 668.
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However, the court concluded that the New Jersey officers had been
legally entitled under the Fourth Amendment to seize La Fontaine pursuant
to the federal arrest warrant.'
Since the apprehension was legal, the
warrantless seizure of the contraband was lawful also, because the
54. Id. at 669. The court applied Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)
(requiring that, absent consent or exigent circumstances, the police may not without an
arrest warrant enter a suspect's home to arrest him therein), after having determined that
La Fontaine was arrested in his home. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 668. See also
People v. Lindsey, 805 P.2d 1134 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, 1991 Colo.
LEXIS 137 (Colo. Mar. 11, 1991), overruledon other groundsby People v. Milton, 864
P.2d 1097 (Colo. 1993) (en banc) (applying Payton to warrantless entry by police
officers acting extrajurisdictionally).
Because a warrant was required to validate the defendant's arrest, the court analyzed
whether the New Jersey warrant and/or the federal warrant validated the arrest under
Paton. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 668. The court found the New Jersey warrant
could be executed only within New Jersey. Id. See N.J. R. Governing Crim. Prac. §
3:3-3(b) (1992) (defining territorial limits of service or execution); N.Y. CRM. PROC.
LAW § 10.10(1), (3) (McKinney 1970) (definition of "criminal courts" and "local
criminal courts" respectively); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 120.10(1) (Warrant of arrest;
definition...). See State v. Bradley, 679 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1983), (holding that an Oregon
arrest warrant was not sufficient to arrest defendant in his home in Iowa), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1041; but cf. State v. Reasoner, 742 P.2d 1363 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)
(upholding warrantless entry into defendant's home by Arizona police officers because
they were aware of a warrant issued for defendant's arrest in Colorado); Commonwealth
v. Sawyer, 452 N.E.2d 1094 (Mass. 1983) (ruling that defendant's arrest in and the
seizure of evidence from defendant's Maine motel room by Maine police officers were
lawful and the latter admissible in a Massachusetts trial for murder because the arrest and
seizure were based on warrants issued for Sawyer's arrest in New York State); Allen v.
Wrightson, 800 F. Supp. 1235 (D.N.J. 1992) (holding that in extradition context, the
Fourth Amendment rights of a suspect who was arrested in his New Jersey home by a
New Jersey law enforcement agent pursuant to a New York State bench warrant were
protected by the issuance of the warrant); State v. Payano, 528 A.2d 721 (R.I. 1987)
(holding that the existence of a valid warrant in one state may be used as a basis for a
lawful arrest in another state, thereby rendering it unnecessary for the latter state to issue
a warrant).
However, the possession of the federal warrant validated La Fontaine's arrest. La
Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 669. The court held that a federal warrant can be executed
in New York State by foreign state police officers, including those from New Jersey. Id.
at 669; cf.People v. Hamilton, 666 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1983) (en bane) (holding that under
Colorado statutory authority police officers with an arrest warrant are prohibited from
crossing jurisdictional lines unless in fresh pursuit of a suspect).
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evidence was obtained under the "plain view" exception.55 Finally, La
Fontaine's statements were deemed admissible.56

On August 19, 1993, in New York State Supreme Court, La Fontaine
pleaded guilty to attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance
in the third degree. 57 On December 10, 1993, he received a jail sentence
of three to six years, because he was found to be a repeat felony

offender.58

The court's opinion in La Fontaine is significant for several reasons.
First, it was the first written authority in New York State to discuss the
legal status and rights of out-of-state officers, not in close pursuit, who

engage in extrajurisdictional activities in New York,59 and are not acting
as agents of any New York law enforcement agency.'

Second, it is the

first New York State opinion to apply the "under color of authority"
doctrine to such activities. Third, it is the first state court authority to
hold explicitly that certain conduct of foreign state police officers falls
within the parameters of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule.
Fourth, the opinion was the first reported New York opinion to hold that
foreign state officers, not in close pursuit, may arrest in New York

pursuant to a valid federal arrest warrant.
55. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 670; see Coolidgev. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971) (permitting the police to seize, without a warrant, evidence found in "plain
view").
56. People v. La Fontaine, No. 11964/92, slip op. at 32-33 (N.Y. Co. Sup. Ct.
June 8, 1993). In so finding, the court held that the New Jersey officers were acting as
agents of New York State when they obtained his admission at the 34th Precinct. Id.
Alternatively, these officers were acting "under color of authority" at the samejuncture.
Id. at 33. Because the statements were voluntary and were obtained in compliance with
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), they were admissible.
57. People v. La Fontaine, (No. 11964/92) Court File (N.Y. Co. Sup. Ct.). The
statutes under which La Fontaine pled were N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 110, 220.16
(McKinney 1965, 1966).
58. Id. As of April 25, 1994, there has been no indication that La Fontaine has
appealed the suppression order.
59. Prior to La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d 660, the Court of Appeals had addressed
the validity of extraterritorial arrests effected by police officers from New York State in
foreign states. People v. Walls, 321 N.E.2d 875 (N.Y. 1974) (deeming valid an
extraterritorial arrest in New Jersey by New York City police officers despite the
officers' unintentional and unknowing failure to comply with New Jersey's fresh pursuit
statute); People v. Sampson, 536 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1989) (upholding the admission of
a statement obtained in Vermont by New York police officers, even if the New York
officers obtained the statement in violation of Vermont's fresh pursuit statute, because
any such violation was unintentional). Walls and Sampson do not address extraterritorial
arrests effected on New York State soil by foreign state officers.
60. See generally People v. Horman, 239 N.E.2d 625 (N.Y. 1978).
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This article will focus on the second and third of these four significant
aspects of the opinion, and analyze the "under color of authority"
principle. Thereafter, it will be recommended that New York State trial
courts and, perhaps, the New York State legislature and appellate courts
apply the "under color of authority" doctrine to cases involving
extraterritorial arrests and seizures of evidence conducted by police
officers from other states. 6' However, before the full-blown analysis of
the "under color of authority" doctrine may be undertaken, it is helpful
to examine the legal status of police officers acting extrajurisdictionally in
New York State, and to discuss briefly principles other than the "under
color of authority" theory, which have been utilized by foreign state
courts.
III. STATUS OF POLICE OFFICERS ACTING EXTRAJURISDICTIONALLY

The La Fontaine court was confronted with an issue new to New York
jurisprudence, but which is nevertheless settled in other states, i.e., what
official arrest powers, if any, do police officers from State A, not
operating in close pursuit, possess when arresting a suspect in State B
alleged to have violated the laws of State A? In the absence of any New
York authority, the La Fontaine court was left with little choice but to
regard the law from other states. 62
Generally, courts have held that State A's officers do not have official
arrest powers unless State B bestows such authority on them.63 A vast
61. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 665. During the suppression hearing Detective
Humphrey stated that, prior to arresting La Fontaine in New York City, he had
surveilled Paterson, New Jersey residents who had purchased narcotics in New York
City. Id. at 663. Also, Detective Humphrey indicated that he had executed warrants
issued by New Jersey in New York State without the assistance of New York State police
officers. Id.
62. Id. at 664-65.
63. 6A C.J.S., supra note 35; 5 Am. JUR. 2d, supranote 35, § 50; see also Russell
G. Donaldson, Annotation, Validity in State Criminal Trial ofArrest Without a Warrant
by identified Peace Officer Outside of Jurisdiction, When Not in Fresh Pursuit, 34
A.L.R.4th 328, 332 (1984); Wright v. State, 850 S.W.2d 34 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that a local law enforcement officer is authorized to effectuate an
extrajurisdictional arrest only if authorized by statute); State v. Hodgson, 200 A.2d 567,
569 (Del. Super. Ct. 1964); Williams v. State, 321 S.E.2d 386, 389 (Ga. Ct. App.
1984) (holding under Georgia law that a DEA agent had no authority to arrest in his
capacity as a Deputy Sheriff) cert. denied sub nom. Batiste v. Georgia, 469 U.S. 966
(1985); People v. Pollard, 575 N.E.2d 970 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (recognizing common
law rule that police officers do not have authority to effect extrajurisdictional arrests, but
holding that Illinois statute has modified such rule to permit arrests anywhere in Illinois);
State v. Wallace, 361 N.E.2d 516 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (acknowledging common law
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majority of court decisions apply this maxim to warrantless arrests.' In
fact, only a handful of reported cases have addressed a scenario in which
the extrajurisdictional arrest was made with an arrest warrant.'
However, all of these authorities permit out-of-state arrests if carried out
by police officers in "close" or "hot" pursuit.'
Thus, foreign state authorities hold that unless a police officer is in
close pursuit of a suspect beyond his bailiwick, such officer has no
authority as a police officer to arrest the suspect. That this rule is followed
by a majority of states left the La Fontaine court with little choice but to
import the mandate to New York, which had no such rule to follow.
However, the rule itself does not determine whether such

extraterritorial arrest is legal. And, the precept fails to provide any theory
or test to determine such legality. This article will next consider the legal

theories utilized by various states throughout the country and the analysis
promulgated by the La Fontaine court. Thereafter, the reasons as to why
the La Fontaine approach is most consonant with New York State
constitutional provisions will be put forth.
IV. "OTHER" THEORIES OF LEGALITY

A. The State Involvement Approach
Under this approach, which is followed in Colorado, a police officer,
not in close pursuit, may not make an extrajurisdictional arrest unless
rule that a police officer may only effect a warrantless arrest in the confines of that
officer's jurisdiction); Van Horn v. State, 802 P.2d 883 (Wyo. 1990) (applying common
law rule confining territorial jurisdiction of municipal police officers to their respective
municipalities).
64. See generally Donaldson, supra note 63.
65. People v. Schultz, 611 P.2d 977 (Colo. 1980)(en bane); San-Martin v. State,
562 So. 2d 776 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d 660; State v.
Payano, 528 A.2d 721 (R.I. 1987); State v. Baton, 488 A.2d 696 (R.I. 1985).
66. 5 AM. JUR. 2d, supra note 35, § 51 (fresh pursuit); see generally People v.
Vigil, 729 P.2d 360 (Colo. 1986) (en bane) (stating rule that a police officer acting
extraterritorially may not effect an arrest unless the officer is in fresh pursuit); Stevenson
v. State, 413 A.2d 1340 (Md. 1980) (recognizing that at common law an exception to
the rule limiting a police officer's authority to arrest within the officer's jurisdiction is
the "fresh pursuit" doctrine); accord Wright v. State, 473 A.2d 530, 533 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1984); State v. De Grote, 347 A.2d 23, 25-6 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1975) (holding that a foreign state officer may not enter New Jersey and act in his
capacity as a police officer unless in fresh pursuit); cf. People v. Hamilton, 666 P.2d
152, 155 (Colo. 1983) (en bane) (holding that under Colorado statutes a police officer
lacks the authority to execute an arrest warrant beyond that officer's jurisdiction unless
in hot pursuit).
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assisted by police officers from the locale of arrest,67 thereby eschewing
the "private citizen approach."'

Hence, the Colorado rule requires

some involvement or participation of officers authorized to arrest in that
state.

9

Rhode Island has essentially applied a rule akin to Colorado's. In
State v. Baton, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island upheld an arrest in
Connecticut by a Rhode Island detective 0 because it occurred under the
supervision of a Connecticut police officer with the power to arrest in
Connecticut. 7
The state involvement approach addresses a concern expressed in State

v. Shipman, a Florida appellate court decision which also applied the
"under color of authority" theory. 2 Shipman upheld an arrest pursuant
to the principle that police officers not in close pursuit, who make
extrajurisdictional arrests have the same arrest authority as do private

citizens.'

However, the Shipman court, sharing a concern conveyed by

the trial court, expressed concern over an increase in extrajurisdictional

activity by police officers in Florida.74 The court preferred to see
foreign state police officers make arrests in Florida only when granted
authority to do so.7' Further, the court noted: "it seems rather ludicrous
for police officials to have to rely upon a citizen's authority to justify an

arrest made in the culmination of an official police operation. "76
67. People v. Hamilton, 666 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1983) (en bane); People v. Wolf, 635
P.2d 213 (Colo. 1981); People v. Schultz, 611 P.2d 977 (Colo. 1980) (en bane) (stating
that so long as individuals with lawful authority to make an arrest are present at the scene
of arrest and participate therein, it is immaterial who executes an arrest warrant); cf.
Commonwealth v. Mason, 476 A.2d 389 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (holding that, although
the service of a search warrant by police officers acting outside their jurisdiction is
unauthorized and illegal, if said officers are accompanied by officers with official power
to act and who participate in conducting and executing the search, then the same is
legal).
68. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
69. Id.
70. 488 A.2d 696 (R.I. 1985). A warrant had been issued for Baton's arrest by a
Rhode Island justice. Id. at 698.
71.
72.
1980).
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.at 700.
370 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 769 (Fla.
370 So. 2d at 1196; see also discussion infra Part IV.B.
370 So. 2d at 1197.
Id.
Id.
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The state involvement approach forestalls reliance on citizen authority
by requiring involvement from local police officers. Additionally, the state
involvement theory can be viewed as deterring unsupervised
extrajurisdictional police activities by foreign state police officers. Indeed,
as expressed in La Fontaine, such activity of police officers unfamiliar
with the law of the state of arrest poses a threat to the rights and liberties
of citizens in these states." Foreign state police officers who are not
required to obtain direct assistance from local officers have no incentive
to do so, increasing the likelihood of such threats to citizens' rights and
liberties. 8
The "posse comitatus" theory is a variation of the state involvement
approach. 9 In State v. Goodman' the Supreme Court of Missouri
rejected an extrajurisdictional arrest in a town outside of Missouri City by
a Missouri City marshal because the marshal was acting under a "posse
comitatus. "8 The court held that such a person is:
neither an officer nor a mere private person, but occupies the
legal position of a posse comitatus and while cooperating with the
sheriff and acting under his orders is just as much clothed with
the protection of the law as the sheriff himself. It is not essential
for a posse comitatus to be and remain in the actual physical
presence of the sheriff; it is sufficient if the two are actually
endeavoring to make the arrest. and acting in concert with a view
to effect their common design 82
Although the arrest was ultimately deemed unlawful on other
grounds," the Goodman court found that the marshal validly acted under
the direction of a sheriff from the town of arrest, and was thus acting
under "posse comitatus."" Significantly, the Goodman court declined
77. 603 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
78. See case cited supra note 60; cf. Shipman, 370 So. 2d at 1197 (expressing
concern regarding an intrastate increase of extrajurisdictional police activity); People v.
Wolf, 635 P.2d 213, 217 (Colo. 1981) (en bane) (failing to approve Denver police
officers' extrajurisdictional arrest in violation of Colorado statutory authority); accord
State v. Wilson, 403 So. 2d 982 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
79. See State v. Goodman, 449 S.W.2d 656, 661 (Mo. 1970) (defining a "posse
comitatus" as a group of private citizens called upon to attend the sheriff).
80. 449 S.W.2d 656.
81. Id. at 661.
82. Id. (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 656.
84. Id.
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to accept the People's argument that the city marshal made a valid
extrajurisdictional arrest as a private citizen. I The court simply restated
the maxim that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches and
seizures conducted by private individuals and determined Goodman's
motion to suppress as a matter of federal constitutional law.86
The significance of the Goodman decision is that it sought to resolve
the legality of the arrest only under the Fourth Amendment and not under
private citizen's statutes as is done by many states. As will be seen in the
following section, many decisions fail to reconcile the applicability of
private citizen's arrest statutes, violation of which may lead to evidence
suppression, and the Fourth Amendment's and exclusionary rule's
inapplicability to arrests effected by private citizens.'
Finally, yet another variation can be found in People v. Seybold.88
In Seybold agents of a joint task force comprised of police officers from
several municipalities arrested Seybold and others.89 Noting the unusual
circumstances of the case, the Seybold court determined the legality of the
arrest under the Fourth Amendment?' because when the officers arrested
Seybold, they "believed at the time that they were acting as police officers
and that they were, in fact, conducting the drug investigation on behalf of
the state. "91
Hence, the conduct of an officer operating
extrajurisdictionally and under such belief was deemed action on behalf of
the state of arrest, thereby necessitating Fourth Amendment scrutiny. This
analysis is no different than those which apply the Fourth Amendment to
police officers acting extrajurisdictionally and with the assistance of those
officers empowered to arrest' or under "posse comitatus."3

85. Id. at 661.
86. Id.
87. See supra notes 4, 39 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Monteiro v. Howard,
334 F. Supp. 411 (D. R.I. 1971) (applying the common law permitting an
extrajurisdictional arrest as that of a private citizen); State v. Slawek, 338 N.W.2d 120
(Wis. Ct. App. 1983); cf. Stevenson v. State, 413 A.2d 1340, 1343 n.2 (Md. 1980)
(declining to consider whether under the United States Constitution an extrajurisdictional
arrest was unlawful on the grounds: 1) that the aggrieved party did not raise a
constitutional question; and 2) that constitutional questions can only be addressed when
non-constitutional grounds have been exhausted).
88. 432 N.E.2d 1132 (Il1. App. Ct. 1981).
89. Id. at 1133.
90. Id. at 1134.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., People v. Wolf, 635 P.2d at 217 (Colo. 1981).
93. See, e.g., Goodman, 449 S.W.2d at 661.
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B. The Private Citizen Approach
Pursuant to the private citizen principle, many states have held that
because police officers, not in close pursuit, who conduct extraterritorial
arrests are to be treated as private citizens, then state law that pertains to
private citizens' arrests determines the legality of the arrest in question.'
Ultimately, a determination of the arrest's propriety will decide whether
evidence obtained in the arrest should be excluded at trial. 95
However, this approach is problematic, particularly for New York.
Generally in New York, evidence suppression motions are brought under
the Fourth Amendment or New York State Constitution article I, § 12, or
both. For both provisions to apply, the state must act. 6 State action may
entail action by government officials or private citizens acting as their
agents.'
Consequently, if foreign state police officers acting
extrajurisdictionally and not under the supervision of New York Agents
have the same legal status to arrest as private citizens, then it must follow
that the Fourth Amendment and the New York State Constitution are
inapplicable to these arrests. Exclusion would be predicated only on a
violation of a statute authorizing private citizens' arrests, a remedy not
provided for by this statute or any other New York State authority. 9
Thus, under the private citizen approach a class of police conduct would
94. See, e.g., State v. McCullar, 520 P.2d 299 (Ariz. 1974) (holding that Colorado
police officers were entitled to make a private citizen's arrest in Arizona under its private
citizen arrest statute); People v. Lacey, 105 Cal. Rptr, 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973); State
v. Kuskowski, 510 A.2d 172 (Conn. 1986); State v. Hodgson, 200 A.2d 567 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1964); Williams v. State, 321 S.E.2d 386 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 966 (1985); People v. Lahr, 589 N.E. 2d 539 (I1. App. Ct. 1992); State v.
O'Kelly, 211 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936 (1974); State v.
Shienle, 545 P.2d 1129 (Kan. 1976); State v. Bickham, 404 So. 2d 929 (La. 1981);
Stevenson v. State, 413 A.2d 1340 (Md. 1980); Commonwealth v. Harris, 415 N.E.2d
216 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981); Wimdschitl v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 355 N.W.2d
146 (Minn. 1984); Nash v. State, 207 So. 2d 104 (Miss. 1968); State v. Keeny, 431
S.W.2d 95 (Mo. 1968); State v. MeDole, 734 P.2d 683 (Mont. 1987); State v.
Littlewind, 417 N.W.2d 361 (N.D. 1987); State v. McDonald, 260 N.W.2d 626 (S.D.
1977); State v. Harp, 534 P.2d 842 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Slawek, 338
N.W.2d 120 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
95. See State v. Stevens, 603 A.2d 1203, 1208 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992) (noting that
this rule applies equally to evidence acquisition by police officers who have made
extrajurisdictional arrests in adjoining jurisdictions and to police officers from one state
who have entered another state and have made arrests and seized evidence therein).
96. See cases cited supra notes 9, 41, & 42.
97. See cases cited supranotes 9, 41-43.
98. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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be beyond federal and state constitutional regulation, a seemingly
anomalous result.
C. The ConstitutionalApproach

A constitutional approach determines that an extrajurisdictional arrest
is illegal if the arrest violates the Fourth Amendment or state constitutional

law. This approach is quite similar to that of La Fontaine, although La
Fontaine additionally requires that foreign state police officers act "under
color of authority" for the Fourth Amendment to be activated.'
° the Supreme Court of Colorado
For example, in People v. Wolf m

upheld an extrajurisdictional arrest conducted by Denver police officers in
Colorado."' The court found that the Denver officers "violated [two]
statutes [including one pertaining to private citizens' arrests] governing

their authority to arrest.""

Because the officers were not acting as

private citizens but as police officers, they had no legal authority to justify
the arrest as that of a private citizen pursuant to the statute authorizing
private citizens' arrests."m The Wolf court, nevertheless, deemed the
arrest lawful under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and the Colorado Constitution." 4 Since the arrest was
predicated on probable cause and thus was not an unreasonable search and
seizure under both of these constitutional provisions, the court refused to
use the exclusionary rule as a remedy for the statutory transgressions
committed by the Denver officers."°5
99. See supra text accompanying notes 44-53.
100. 635 P.2d 213 (Colo. 1981) (en bane).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 217. The statutes pertained to extrajurisdictional arrests (COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 16-3-102, 16-3-106 (1986)) and private citizens' arrests (Colo. Rev. Stat. §
16-3-201 (1986). 635 P.2d at 216. The basis for the violation under the latter statute was
that the police officers were not deemed to be acting as private citizens. Id. at 217.
103. 635 P.2d at 217. This pronouncement is similar to that found in cases applying
the "under color of authority" doctrine. See e.g., La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d 660, 668
(finding that extrajurisdictionally operating officers were not acting as private citizens,
but as police officers, thus triggering the application of the Fourth Amendment and the
exclusionary rule); Commonwealth v. Troutman, 302 A.2d 430, 432 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1973) (holding that a police officer exhibiting the indicia of her office acts like a police
officer and not as a private citizen).
104. 635 P.2d at 217; see COLO. CONST. art. II, § 7.
105. 635 P.2d at 217. However, the Wofcourt did not sanction the Denver officers'
unauthorized extraterritorial operation and warned that similar future transgressions could
trigger the application of the exclusionary rule. Id.
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Wolf bucks the trend deeming arrests invalid if violative of statutory

or decisional law pertaining to private citizens' arrests. Despite finding
that the Denver police officers had no statutory authority to make an
extrajurisdictional arrest or even to arrest as private citizens, the highest
court in Colorado expressly decided not to cite these violations as a basis
for excluding evidence obtained by the Denver officers in the arrest. In
fact, to exclude the seized evidence, the key issue was not whether such
statutory transgressions transpired, but whether they were of constitutional
dimensions."°6 Consequently, the Wolf court found violations of two
separate arrest statutes, did not deem the violations to be dispositive, and
applied only federal and state constitutional prohibitions against
unreasonable searches and seizures to determine the legality of arrest.
Wolf sparked a series of decisions which ruled that statutory violations
committed by police officers were not dispositive as to the legality of
extrajurisdictional arrests." °7
A similar approach can be found in State v. Mangum,' which
preceded Wolf. In Mangum the Court of Appeals of North Carolina noted

that, under a North Carolina provision, " an arrest by a Franklinton,
North Carolina sheriff three miles beyond Franldinton city limits was
106. Id.
107. See People v. Florez, 680 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1984) (en bane) (construing People
v. Hamilton, 666 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1983) (en bane) as promulgating a two-step analysis
to extrajurisdictional arrest: (1) A determination as to whether the police officer exceeded
statutory authority in making such an arrest; and (2) Whether the arrest violated
constitutional proscriptions against unreasonable searches and seizures); see also People
v. Vigil, 729 P.2d 360 (Colo. 1986)(en banc)(following the two-step analysis delineated
in Hamilton); People v. Lindsey, 805 P.2d 1134, 1137 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990), cert.
denied, 1991 Colo. LEXIS 137 (Colo. Mar. 11, 1991), overruled on other grounds by
People v. Milton, 864 P.2d 1097 (Colo. 1993) (en bane) (holding that an
extrajurisdictional arrest is not illegal even if in violation of a Colorado statute, so long
as the violation is not willful or so egregious as to infringe on a suspect's constitutional
rights); cf. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 665 (wherein the trial court declined to
consider any statutory violation as a basis for excluding evidence.) See also cases cited
infra note 120.
It should be noted that Hamilton held that the exclusionary rule is designed to
protect against the violation of constitutional rights and that the violation of statutes
pertaining to arrest authority is not a per se violation of constitutionally protected rights.
666 P.2d at 156.
108. 226 S.E.2d 852 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976).
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-402(c) (1988) (territorial jurisdiction of officers to
make arrests). The statute granted law enforcement officers from North Carolina's cities
the power to arrest "at any point which is one mile or less from the nearest point in the
boundary of such city." Id.
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unauthorized.'
However, although the arrest was not statutorily
authorized, it was valid under the Fourth Amendment because it was
predicated on probable cause.' Furthermore, the Mangum court held
that evidence obtained as a result of an apprehension which is
constitutionally sound but afoul of the law of North Carolina should not
be excluded at trial.1 ' As was true for the Wolf court, in Mangum the
decisive factor triggering the application of the exclusionary rule was
whether the arrest ran counter to the Fourth Amendment's proscriptions
rather than whether the police officers were statutorily authorized to effect
an extrajurisdictional arrest.
Finally, in Graham v. State, a Florida court rejected an
extrajurisdictional arrest conducted in state"' because the police officers
arrested the defendant in his motel room without an arrest warrant, in
violation of the Fourth Amendment and of Payton v. New York." 4
Again, a significant constitutional violation was dispositive.
The constitutional approach, especially the one utilized in Wolf, is
very similar to the one found in La Fontaine."5 Both decisions
eschewed reliance on the view that extrajurisdictional arrests should be
considered as those by a private citizen. Both invoked federal and state
constitutional law to determine the propriety of such arrests. The
differences between the two approaches are minor, if not merely semantic.
Without expressly alluding to the "under color of authority" doctrine,
Wolf declined to apply the Colorado statute authorizing private citizens'
arrests because the police officers were acting as police officers. 6
Thereafter, Wolf applied constitutional precepts outright to judge the
validity of the arrest at issue. 7 Likewise, La Fontaine declined to find
110. Mangum, 226 S.E.2d at 853-54.
111. Id. at 854.
112. Id. The Mangum court applied the teachings of State v. Eubanks, 196 S.E.2d
706 (N.C. 1973) in support of this proposition. In Eubanks a police officer illegally
arrested the defendant without a warrant in violation of North Carolina statutory law and
obtained evidence as a result of the arrest. 196 S.E.2d at 707-08. The Eubanks court held
that if an arrest is constitutionally sound but illegal under the law of North Carolina,
evidence acquired as a result of the arrest should not be excluded. Id.d at 709. The court
stated: "An unlawful arrest may not be equated, as defendant seeks to do, to an unlawful
seizure." Id.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

406 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
Id. at 505; see cases cited supra note 54.
603 N.Y.S.2d 660 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993).
See supra text accompanying notes 100-07.
See Wolf, 635 P.2d 213.
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that New York's private citizen arrest statute was dispositive. 11 8 The La

Fontaine court applied the Fourth Amendment only after expressly
concluding that the New Jersey officers were operating "under color of
authority" by acting as police officers and not as private citizens. 1 9
Thus, the only distinction between the two cases is that La Fontaine
invoked by name the "under color of authority" doctrine and Wolf did not.

Both cases achieved the same end, that is, that extrajurisdictional police
behavior falls only within the scope of federal and state constitutional
law. 120

V.

THE "UNDER COLOR OF

AuTHoRITY" DOCTRiNE

Generally, following the "under color of authority" theory, a police

officer who operates beyond his jurisdiction may not use his position as
a police officer to view illegal activity or "to gain access to evidence not
available to a private citizen."121 The doctrine has precluded officers
from claiming the right to arrest as private citizens" and has triggered
the application of the Fourth Amendment." z
A. The View from Florida:Collins v. State and Progeny
Florida was the first state to promulgate the "under color of authority"
analysis. The first reported case was Collins v. State, " in which police
118. See supra text accompanying notes 30-40.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 44-53.
120. See infra part VI; see also City of Kettering v. Hollen, 416 N.E.2d 598 (Ohio
1980) (holding that, as to extrajurisdictional police conduct in contravention of Ohio law,
the federal exclusionary rule will not be applied to evidence obtained as a result of police
activity if constitutional rights are not infringed); State v. Peterson, No. 15936, 1993
Ohio App. LEXIS 2267 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 21, 1993). Contra Commonwealth v.
Fiume, 436 A.2d 1001 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (without invoking the Fourth Amendment,
the court decided that under Pennsylvania statutory law an arrest founded on an
extrajurisdictional investigation was illegal, and that any evidence obtained as a result of
the arrest was excludable); Commonwealth v. Saul, 499 A.2d 358 (Pa. Super.Ct. 1985)
(deciding that the exclusionary rule is an inappropriate sanction as to evidence obtained
through an investigation conducted extrajurisdictionally by a municipal detective).
121. Phoenixv. State, 455 So. 2d 1024, 1025 (Fla. 1984). Phoenix appears to have
promulgated Florida's most current version of the "under color of authority" doctrine.
122. Commonwealth v. Troutman, 302 A.2d 430 (Pa. 1973).
123. State v. Stevens, 603 A.2d 1203 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992), aff'd, 620 A.2d 789
(Conn. 1993); see also People v. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d 660, 666.
124. 143 So. 2d 700 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1962), cert. denied, 148 So. 2d 280 (Fla.
1962).
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officers from the City of West Palm Beach, Florida were investigating
marijuana trafficking, presumably in West Palm Beach.12 Herbert Lee
Collins was implicated in this activity and the police officers were led out
of the jurisdiction to Riviera Beach, Florida." The officers went to a
Riviera Beach motel, where they believed Collins was staying."z At the
motel the officers, who were in uniform, went to Collins's room and
knocked on his door.12
Collins recognized the officers through a
peephole and invited them into his motel room. 29 Upon entering the
room, the officers observed a marijuana plant, and eventually seized it
along with other pieces of incriminating evidence revealed in a search of
the room. 13
Collins was then arrested."' Before conducting this
warrantless search, the officers did not request to search the premises, and
did not obtain Collins's consent to do so.32 The officers did not arrest
Collins pursuant to an arrest warrant.
At a pre-trial suppression hearing the trial court granted Collins's
motion to suppress all evidence seized by the police except for the
marijuana plant, which was originally observed protruding from a waste
basket and was in plain view.133 Collins was convicted of growing and
possessing marijuana. 3
Collins appealed his conviction to the Florida District Court of
Appeal, Second District. 3
The district court reversed the
conviction.'36 Emphasizing the inviolability of a suspect's rights under
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution and
125. Id. at 701. In the district court opinion, there is no explicit indication as to
where the alleged marijuana trafficking transpired. However, language in the opinion
indicating that the West Palm Beach officers were entitled to engage in law enforcement
activities in West Palm Beach leads to the inference that the West Palm Beach officers
were conducting their investigation of the trafficking within West Palm Beach. Id. at 703.
126. Id. at 702. Another suspect involved in the trafficking implicated Collins. Id.
at 701.
127. Id. at 702.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 700.
136. Id. at 701.
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under the Florida Constitution,137 the district court held that the West
Palm Beach officers had no power to conduct the extrajurisdictional arrest
in Riviera Beach, and, at most, had only the power to act as private
citizens.138 Up to this point the Florida district court opinion followed
the vast majority of cases by applying a private citizen arrest analysis to
determine whether police acting beyond their bailiwicks effected a lawful
However, at this juncture the district court departed
arrest.139
significantly from these other decisions. The court noted that the
investigation began in West Palm Beach and that the officers' activity in
Riviera Beach was part of a continuing investigation they had lawfully
begun in West Palm Beach." 4
The court then stated that "their presence at the door of the motel
room, in the uniform signifying their official position as police officers,
was part of a continuing investigation begun as police officers. They were
acting under color of their office."' 4 ' The district court noted that
Collins acquiesced to the police officers because they had asserted their
authority. 42 Then the court proclaimed: "Any officer gaining access to
private living quarters under color of his office and of the law which he
personifies must then have some valid basis in law for the intrusion." 43
In reversing the conviction, the court concluded that any other rule would
infringe "'the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects'"'" and would render government a police-state in
which the police "are the law." 45 The government appealed the district
137. Id. at 702.
138. Id. at 703.
139. See cases and authorities cited supranote 94. The Collins court acknowledged
that police officers operating extrajurisdictionally may be treated as private citizens and
can effect private citizens' arrests. 143 So. 2d at 703.
140. 143 So. 2d at 703.
141. Id.
142. Id.; cf. Marden v. State, 203 So. 2d 638 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). In
Marden police officers acting extrajurisdictionally drove in a marked police car alongside
Marden, a robbery suspect. Id. at 639. Marden surrendered to the officers and was
placed under arrest. The Marden court did not consider any claim that the arrest was
effected "under color of authority."
143. Collins, 143 So. 2d at 703.
144. Id. Although the court did not attribute any authority to this quote, the
language appears to be quoted from the Fourth Amendment. This Amendment, in
pertinent part, states: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects shall not be violated...." U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
145. 143 So. 2d at 703 (citations omitted).
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court decision and the Supreme Court of Florida denied certiorari without
opinion."
This opinion merits several observations. First, the court promulgates
the "under color" principle without any citation to specific statutory or
common law authority. Second, the "under color" rule may arguably
apply only to police entry into private living quarters because the rule is
mentioned only in the context of such entry. 47 Third, although the
district court does not expressly cite the Fourth Amendment as a basis for
its rule, the Fourth Amendment implicitly provides such a basis because
the court requires that an officer acting under color of authority and
beyond his jurisdiction must have legal grounds for such action and that
any other requirement would abridge rights granted by the Fourth
Amendment."' Fourth, the Collins court does not deem illegal an
extrajurisdictional arrest made under "color of authority"; rather, the test
is whether the arrest violates the Fourth Amendment. Fifth, whether the
officers had the right as private citizens to arrest Collins was irrelevant to
the court's analysis. Sixth, the district court opinion sought to safeguard
the same Fourth Amendment right of privacy in one's residence as the
Supreme Court did 18 years later in Payton v. New York.' 49
In State v. Crum,"5 the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third
District extended the "under color of authority" principle to extraterritorial
arrests predicated on an undercover sale of narcotics. 15 ' In Crum, a
police officer acting undercover outside of his jurisdiction met with
Benjamin Crum and purchased narcotics from him.'
The officer then
arrested Crum where the deal had transpired.' 53 An officer empowered
to arrest also participated."
Crum moved to suppress the narcotics
obtained on the grounds that the undercover officer was operating beyond
his bailiwick at the time of the purchase and arrest. 55 The trial court
granted the motion.' 56
146. State v. Collins, 148 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1962).
147. See 143 So. 2d at 703.
148. Id.
149. 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980).
150. 323 So. 2d 673 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).

151. Id.
152. Id.

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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On appeal, the district court applied a four-point analysis.157 First,
the court held that the undercover officer's extrajurisdictional activities
were those of a private citizen.158 Second, the court noted that the
activities were valid only if a private citizen would have had the right to
arrest in these circumstances.1 59 Third, the court stated that "[w]hether
the officer['s] . . .actions are sustainable as a private citizen must be
determined by ascertaining whether [the undercover] officer . . . was
acting 'under color of his office' at the time of the contraband purchase
and subsequent arrest. " " And fourth, the court defined the "under
color of office" doctrine as one entailing a law enforcement officer who
represents himself 1as
a police officer by either wearing a uniform or by
61
some other means.
The district court then applied its rule to the facts, concluded that the
undercover officer had the same right to arrest Crum as would a private
citizen, and reversed the trial court. 62 Of significance to the court was
that the officer was working undercover and always held himself out as a
private citizen." 6 Therefore, the officer was in the same position as a
private citizen to obtain incriminating evidence and to arrest."6
Although the Crum court cited Collins, it varied the Collins rule and
extended its sweep. First, the Crum court did not confine the Collins rule
to a citizen's private residence, but, basically extended it to any
location. 1"
Second, unlike Collins, Crum did not predicate a
determination of an arrest's validity on the Fourth Amendment but did so
on whether a private citizen would have had the right to arrest. Third,
even though Collins seemed to suggest that an arrest effected "under color
of office" was permissible if sanctioned by the Fourth Amendment," 6
Crum implicitly conveyed the notion that such arrest was illegal. This is
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 673-74 (citation omitted).
Id. at 674 (citing FLA. ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 111 (1971)).

162. Id.
163. Id. at 674.
164. Id.
165. Although the Crum court did not indicate where the undercover officer
conducted the narcotics transaction or effected Crum's arrest, it is apparent from the
holding that the "under color of authority" rule does not apply only to a person's home.
See 323 So. 2d at 674 (quoting FLA. ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 111 (1971)). Compare the
language in Collins which appears to confine the doctrine to a police invasion of the
home. Collins v. State, 143 So. 2d 700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
166. Collins, 143 So. 2d at 703.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

so because the undercover officer did not exert the power of his office and
was consequently in the same position as a private citizen when he
engaged in the activities which served to validate Crum's arrest.167 Had
the undercover officer represented himself as a police officer, and thereby
put himself in a more favorable position than a private citizen to obtain
evidence and arrest Crum, it is reasonable to assume that the district court
would have upheld Crum's motion to suppress.
Four years after Crum, the Florida District Court of Appeal, Second
District rendered a decision in State v. Williams." In Williams, during
an investigation of a robbery in Gulfport, Florida, Gulfport police officer
John Nelson, who was in uniform, took a witness to James A. Williams's
residence in St. Petersburg, Florida."
The witness there observed a
car parked on the street and identified it as having been used in the
robbery. 7 A police officer from St. Petersburg responded to Nelson's
call for assistance."' Williams then entered his car, and tried to drive
off."
The St. Petersburg officer stopped the car and acquiesced as
Officer Nelson administered the Miranda warnings to Williams and
questioned him about his activities at the time of the Gulfport robbery."
Another Gulfport police unit arrived with another witness, who identified
Williams as the getaway driver.174
Officer Nelson then arrested
167. Id.
168. 366 So. 2d 135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). Contra State v. Jimerson, 330 So.
2d 169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (Mager, J.dissenting). Jimerson upheld without
opinion a trial order granting evidence suppression. Id. The dissenting judge would have
affirmed contending that the subject extraterritorial arrest was valid as a private citizen's
arrest. Id. at 170. According to the facts delineated in the dissent, a policeman outside
of his jurisdiction, after trailing Jimerson, identified himself as a police officer to
Jimerson by showing Jimerson his badge. Id. Thereafter the officer conducted a fruitful
search for contraband. Id. Without referring to the "under color of authority" principle,
Justice Mager stated, "[w]ith all due respect, it is inconceivable to me under these
circumstances that a police officer, because he was a police officer, lacked the power of
an ordinary citizen; and that the officer should have refrained from taking any action..
• ." Id. (emphasis added). From this language, it would appear that Justice Mager would
not allow the "under color of authority" doctrine to serve as a means to render unlawful
the actions of police officers acting extraterriorially. See id.
169. Williams, 366 So. 2d at 136. Williams' residence was just a few blocks from
the robbery. Id. There is an indication that the officer was not proceeding in hot pursuit.
Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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Williams, seized his car, and ultimately recovered contraband from it.175
Before trial, Williams moved to suppress the contraband, asserting that the
car containing it was seized by Officer Nelson while operating out of his

jurisdiction.176 The trial court granted the motion to suppress and the

1
government appealed. 77
The District Court of Appeal overturned the suppression order. 8
The court held that Officer Nelson had the right to act as a citizen and to
seize evidence. 171 The court then ruled: "[N]onetheless, a police officer
cannot justify a seizure made outside his jurisdiction as the action of a

private citizen if he is acting under color of his office, and thereby gains

access to evidence not available to a private citizen. " " The court went
on to state that Officer Nelson did not use the color of his office to view
Williams's car, since it was parked on a public street and readily

observable by anyone."'
Although the court cited Collins as authority for its main
proposition," n the Williams decision was closer to Crum than to Collins.
While Collins permits police officers acting extrajurisdictionally and under

color of their office to enter a residence if such entry is legally cognizable,
Crum and Williams ostensibly do not permit such entry if a private citizen

would not normally have access to the residence.

Thus, Crum and

Williams are closer to cases holding that officers acting extraterritorially

and not in hot pursuit have the same right to arrest as private citizens.1 3
175. 366 So. 2d 135.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 136-37. The Williams court cited State v. Crum, 323 So. 2d 673 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975) for the proposition that a private citizen has the right to seize
evidence. Wifliams, 366 So. 2d at 136. See supratext accompanying notes 150-67.
180. Williams, 366 So. 2d at 136. The court relied upon Collins v. State, 143 So.
2d 700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) for this statement. See supratext accompanying notes
124-49.
181. 366 So. 2d at 136-37. The court followed authorities from other states which
admitted evidence obtained under like circumstances. Id. at 137. These were State v.
Harp, 534 P.2d 842 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that a Deputy Town Marshal could
arrest Harp outside of his jurisdiction as a private citizen because he had reasonable and
probable cause to arrest Harp); People v. Lacey, 105 Cal. Rptr. 72 (Cal. Ct. App.
1973), State v. Keeny, 431 S.W.2d 95 (Mo. 1968) (ruling that a police officer beyond
his bailiwick was entitled as a private citizen to arrest a robbery suspect); Nash v. State,
207 So. 2d 104 (Miss. 1968) (deeming an extrajurisdictional apprehension to be a lawful
private citizen's arrest).
182. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
183. See cases cited supra note 94.
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However, Crum and Williams impose an added burden on the government
because an officer may not validly make a private citizen's arrest while
acting "under color of authority.""8 4
This approach was followed by the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District in State v. Shipman. 185 Shipman entailed an extraterritorial
undercover sale of narcotics. The Fourth District followed Williams and
Crum and held that an undercover officer buying narcotics was in no more
of a favorable position to arrest suspects and seize evidence than a private
citizen would have been."8 6 The Shipman court defined "under color of
office," as "refer[ring] to a law enforcement officer actually holding
himself out as a police officer, by either wearing his uniform or in some
other manner openly asserting his official position, in order to observe the
unlawful activity involved or the contraband seized."" w While this
definition is basically consistent with the holdings of Crum and
Williams," it appears to confine the doctrine to extrajurisdictional
observations of unlawful activity or to evidence recovered.1 9 The
statement does not refer to arrests, themselves, such as the one detailed in
La Fontaine, in which police officers from one jurisdiction enter another
jurisdiction solely to effect an arrest in the latter place. 9°
Likewise, in State v. Chapman, 9' the Florida District Court of
Appeal, Third District followed Crum and held that an off-duty police
officer not in uniform and operating beyond his bailiwick did not have the
authority to conduct a stop and frisk of a suspect because private citizens
do not have such a right," 2 The district court also invalidated
Chapman's seizure because the officer exerted the color of his office in
effecting the seizure by identifying himself as a police officer, displaying
his badge, issuing Chapman a directive, patting him down, and detaining
him for local authorities. " It is somewhat unclear from the opinion
184. Crum, 323 So. 2d at 673; Williams, 366 So. 2d at 136.
185. 370 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 769 (Fla.

1980).
186. 370 So. 2d at 1196-97.
187. Id.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 150-84.
189. See 370 So. 2d at 1196-97.
190. See discussion supra part II.
191. 376 So. 2d 262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
192. Id. at 264. The court issued this proclamation under Florida's stop and frisk
statute. Id.; see FLA. STAT. ch. 901.151 (1977); see also State v. Schuyler, 390 So. 2d
458 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (applying Chapman to an extraterritorial stop not
predicated on probable cause by an off-duty municipal officer).
193. 376 So. 2d at 264.
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whether such action under color of authority rendered the arrest 1illegal,
although such can be inferred by the court's reference to Collins. 94
After Chapman, the Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District
in McAnnis v. State19 and State v. Pinoamador'9 presented facts akin
to those in Crum, in which an undercover police
officer conducted 19a8
1
narcotics transaction beyond his jurisdiction. 1 Quoting Shipman,
the McAnnis court held that because the undercover officer represented
himself as a private citizen and did not take advantage of his status as a
police officer to purchase the narcotics, the "under color of authority"
doctrine was inapplicable. 1" Likewise, the Pinoamadorcourt employed
the same analysis and reached the same result, notwithstanding the

undercover officers' use of an official unmarked police vehicle and that
they were on duty at the time of the purchase.'
From Collins through McAnnis and Pinoamadorthe "under color of
law" doctrine was applied to warrantless arrests." Would the result be
the same if the doctrine is applied to an apprehension based on a search
warrant? In Wilson v. State' the Florida District Court of Appeal,
First District reversed a trial order denying Wilson's motion to suppress
evidence. Police officers from Lake City, Florida had investigated
Wilson's putative possession of narcotics outside of Lake City.'
The
194. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 124-49. This inference can be
drawn because Crum, 323 So. 2d 673 and Williams, 366 So. 2d 135 render such arrests
illegal by referring directly to Collins. See supra accompanying notes 150-84. Also, the
Chapman court utilized the same approach. 376 So. 2d at 264.
195. 386 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
196. 389 So. 2d 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) Ruben Maquera was a named
defendant in this case. Id.
197. In McAnnis's Dade County, Florida residence, an undercover police officer
from Broward County, Florida along with one other individual purchased drugs from
McAnnis. 386 So. 2d at 1231. At the end of the transaction, the undercover officer
identified himself as a Broward police officer and announced his intent to detain McAnnis
and the other individual until the arrival of Dade County police officers. Id.
In Pinoamador,City of Hialeah Gardens police officers purchased contraband from
Pinoamador and Ruben Maquera in Miami. 389 So. 2d at 318.
198. 386 So. 2d at 1232.
199. 386 So. 2d at 1232.
200. 389 So. 2d at 318. Also, the court held that, even though the officers acted
"under color of authority" with respect to a confidential informant who gave the officers
information on Pinoamador and Mdquera, the two defendants could not vicariously claim
that the officers acted "under color of authority" as to them. Id.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 124-200.
202. 403 So. 2d 982 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
203. Id. at 983.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

Lake City officers placed an electronic listening device on confidential
informant and directed him to buy drugs at one of Wilson's homes.'
After the sale, a Lake City officer obtained a warrant to search Wilson's
home, which was outside of the Lake City limits.'
With the help of
officers from the county in which Wilson lived, the Lake City officers
searched the home, seized contraband and arrested Wilson.'
At the
suppression hearing the Lake City officers conceded that they did not have
the authority to execute the search warrant or to arrest Wilson.?
Initially, the Wilson court acknowledged that a municipal police
officer may conduct investigations out of her jurisdiction, so long as the
subject matter of the investigation originated in her jurisdiction,"5 and
that a police officer acting as a private citizen may have the same
right. The court further held that the investigation would have been
lawful only if a private citizen would have been in the same position to
conduct a similar investigation. 210 However, the court found that the
Lake City officers were not authorized as private citizens to intercept the
communications transmitted over the electronic recording device placed on
the informant. 211 Having made such determination, the District Court
of Appeal then grappled with the validity of the search warrant. 12 The
court applied the "under color of authority" doctrine articulated in
Shipman21 and ruled that the entire investigation and affidavit used by
the Lake City police to obtain the warrant were improper.1 4 Because
the Lake City police, who had no more authority to proceed than private
204. Id.
205. Id. It is presumed that Wilson's home was beyond city limits because of
hearing testimony that the police officers had no authority to effect the subject
extraterritorial arrest. Id. at 984.
206. Id. at 983.
207. Id. at 983-84.
208. Id. at 984 (citing State v. Chapman, 376 So. 2d 262 and Parker v. State, 362
So. 2d 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (finding that Parker obstructed a police officer
engaged in a legal duty, even though such engagement entailed an extrajurisdictional
investigation commenced within the officers bailiwick)).
209. Wilson, 403 So. 2d at 984.
210. Id.
211. Id. This determination was based on FLA. STAT. ch. 934.03(2)(c), (d), which
would have authorized the interception had all parties given prior consent to the
interception. Such was not the case in Wilson. 403 So. 2d at 984.
212. 403 So. 2d at 984.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 185-90.
214. 403 So. 2d at 984.
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citizens, had "acted under color of authority" to induce the issuance of the
warrant, it was deemed invalid.215

The moral of Wilson is that what rendered the Lake City police
activity illegal was not the Fourth Amendment principles and concerns
raised in Collins,"6 but that the officers exerted the power of their office
to obtain the search warrant. In fact, Collins may have upheld the Lake
City officers' exercise of the color of their office if they had proceeded on
some valid basis, perhaps via a search warrant.'
Instead, for the
Wilson court such exercise, which induced the issuance of a warrant, ipso
facto rendered the conduct illegal.
Another substantial Florida case is Phoenix v. State, a case from the
Florida District Court, Fourth District, which ostensibly limited the
"under color of authority" doctrine to the acquisition of evidence secured
by the assertion of such authority and which also determined that arrests
based on such acquisition are unlawful.21 In Phoenix, police officers
from Martin County, Florida conducted a covert surveillance of a reputed

smuggling operation in St. Lucie County.219

The investigation

commenced in Martin County and continued into St. Lucie County where
the Martin County officers, before the arrival of officers from St. Lucie
County, used their lights to stop a truck suspected of participating in the
smuggling,'
drew and pointed their guns, identified themselves as
215. Id. Also, the Wilson court expressed the same concern raised by the Shipman
court as to the proliferation of extrajurisdictional activities by municipal police officers;
see also Shipman, 370 So. 2d at 1197.
Although the Wilson court is not clear as to which court issued the subject warrant,
it would have been deemed invalid under either of these two possible scenarios: (1) a
warrant issued by a Lake City court but executed extraterritorially; or (2) a warrant
issued by a court located outside of Lake City. Because Wilson's alleged illegal conduct
transpired outside of Lake City, it is reasonable to conclude that the warrant was issued
by a court sitting within the jurisdiction of Wilson's residence. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §
3.120 (West 1994) (Committing Magistrate).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 124-49.
217. 403 So. 2d 982. However, assuming that the warrant was issued by a court
sitting in a jurisdiction within Lake City, the warrant would have been invalid if executed
outside of Lake City. See supra notes 51 and 215 and accompanying text.
218. 428 So. 2d 262 (Dist. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 455 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1984).
Steven Michael Trusz, Morton Neal Hall, Jr., and Richard Hale were co-litigants with
Michael Harrision Phoenix. Id.
219. 428 So. 2d at 264. Although the court confined its ruling to an intrastate
extrajurisdictional arrest, its decision can easily be applied to interstate extraterritorial
arrests. See, e.g., supra note 95 and accompanying text.
220. 428 So. 2d at 264.
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police officers, and ordered the occupants out.22' The Martin County
officers opened the truck and seized marijuana.'
The occupants of the
truck were arrested. 2 Before trial, the defendants moved to suppress

evidence found in the truck.'

The trial court granted the motion,

finding that by their actions, the Martin County officers illegally utilized
the color of office beyond their jurisdiction.
The state appealed.'
Initially, the court held that the halting of the truck and its occupants

in St. Lucie County was an arrest.'

The court then reiterated the basic

tenet that officers generally are not authorized to make extrajurisdictional
arrests if not in fresh pursuit.'
The court determined that the trial
court correctly found that the Martin County officers were not empowered
to arrest the occupants of the truck stopped in St. Lucie County.'
The Phoenix court recognized that police officers have a common law
right as citizens to effect private citizens' arrests.'
Further, the court
stated: "We do not mean to imply that police officers acting outside their
jurisdictions are treated as private persons for purposes of the exclusionary
rule."2 3' Rather, it held that the state legislature, by bestowing upon

police officers the authority to arrest, did not deny them their common law

right to effect a private citizen's arrest2?32
The court then stated that the purpose of the "under color of office"
doctrine is "to prevent officers from improperly asserting official authority
221. Id.
222. Id. Another truck was seized in Martin County; its occupants were also
arrested. Id. at 262.
223. Although it is not stated in the opinion, it can reasonably be inferred from the
reference to "defendants" challenging the stop of the truck that these defendants were its
occupants. Id. at 265.

224. Id at 265.
225. Id. at 265-66.
226. Id. at 265. Also suppressed was evidence seized from the truck stopped in
Martin County and a confession. Id. at 265. The basis for such suppression was that this
evidence was tainted by the unlawful arrest in St. Lucie County. Id.
227. Id. The court relied on McAnnis v. State, 386 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980). McAnnis promulgated the four elements constituting an arrest. Id. at 1232.
228. Phoenix, 428 So. 2d at 265, citing State v. Shipman, 370 So. 2d 1195 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1980); FLA.STAT. ch. 901.25
(1979) (authorizing extraterritorial arrests if made in fresh pursuit).
229. 428 So. 2d at 265.
230. Id. (citing Shipman, 370 So. 2d 1195).
231. 428 So. 2d at 265.
232. Id.
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to gather evidence not otherwise obtainable." 3
If there is such
improper assertion, then such evidence must be excluded.'
Arrests
based on evidence acquired illegally under color of authority are unlawful
and the "fruits" of such arrest must be suppressed. 5 However, "this
doctrine does not prevent officers from making an otherwise valid citizen's
arrest just because they happen to be in uniform or otherwise clothed with
the indicia of their position when making the arrest.""
So long as
officers acting extraterritorially have a sufficient basis for making a
citizen's arrest, they should not be obliged to surrender the indicia of their
authority before making the arrest."
Furthermore, an officer in
uniform or in a marked patrol car who inadvertently observes a felony
should not be precluded from carrying out a valid citizen's arrest."ms
Accordingly, the appellate court disagreed with the trial court's
finding that the arrests were predicated on the forbidden assertion of
authority. 9 The Martin County officers asserted their authority only
to arrest, not to ferret out evidence.'
For the court, this assertion plus
the officers' use of a police car to make the apprehensions was "not
enough to prevent them from making valid citizens' arrests."" 4 The
appellate court remanded the case to ascertain whether sufficient legal
basis for the arrests existed and whether the acquisition of the evidence
was lawfl. 42
The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed, 3 basically adopting the
district court's holding and reasoning. The supreme court noted the
ambiguity of the "under color of authority" doctrine and that its
application has led to "inconsistent results."2 4 It appeared to reject the
233. Id. at 266.
234. Id.

235. Id.
236. 1d; see United States v. Hernandez, 715 F.2d 548 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1009 (1984) (upholding under Florida law an extraterritorial arrest by
officers who, at the time of arrest, held themselves out as police officers, but discovered
innocently as private citizens the commission of the underlying felony).

237. 428 So. 2d at 266.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 267.
242. Id.
243. 455 So. 2d 1024.
244. Id. at 1025; see United States v. Ible, 630 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying
Florida's "under color of authority" doctrine to police officers who observe unlawful
activity or seized contraband while acting extraterritorially).
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view endorsed in Chapman that "a police officer is acting under color of
office if he announces he is a police officer and displays his badge when
making an arrest outside his jurisdiction."'a However, it accepted the
majority position among Florida authorities barring police officers from
utilizing the power of their office to observe illegal conduct or to gain
access to evidence beyond a private citizen's reach.'
It held that the
district court correctly relied on these cases in its ruling and correctly
applied the law.'A
The Phoenix rulings require several observations. First, the holdings
appear to be derived from common law principles and are not based on
any reference to the Fourth Amendment or the Florida Constitution.
Second, while the district court cites Collins when it defines the "under
color of authority" doctrine,' it relies primarily on Collins's progeny,
Wilson, to hold that evidence obtained by the exercise of an officer's
illegal assertion of authority must be suppressed." 9 Third, the higher
courts explicitly refused to hold that a police officer's self-identification
as such or mere use of the visible and superficial indicia of his position,
such as a badge, marked police car, or police lights, is enough to
invalidate a private citizen's arrest.'
Fourth, the appellate court
limited the "under color of authority" rule to the acquisition of evidence
through the assertion of police authority."
Finally, an extrajurisdictional arrest is valid as a private citizen's arrest, even if the
officers use the indicia of their office to effect the arrest unless the arrest
is based on evidence obtained through exertion of police power. 52
The Phoenix rulings exemplify the vast evolution of the "under color
of authority" doctrine. At least in Florida, the current state of the
doctrine significantly varies from that promulgated in the seminal Collins
case, in that it addresses only arrest law. Whereas Collins concerned itself
with the defendant's reaction to the exertion of police authority, and
245. 455 So. 2d at 1025.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. 428 So. 2d at 266 (citing McAnnis, 386 So. 2d 1230, and Shipman, 370 So.
2d 1195).
249. 428 So. 2d at 266.
250. 428 So. 2d at 266-67; 455 So. 2d at 1025. In fact, one authority outside of
Florida has viewed Phoenix as having limited the application of the "under color of
authority" doctrine to evidence acquisition of the ferreting out of criminal activity. See
State v. Littlewind, 417 N.W.2d 361, 363 (N.D. 1987).
251. 428 So. 2d at 266. It can be inferred that this rule applies to evidence obtained
both before and after an arrest.
252. 428 So. 2d at 266-67; 455 So. 2d at 1025.
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concomitant surrendering of his privacy in letting the police officers into
his motel room,2 3 there was no expressed solicitude for the protection
of such privacy in either Phoenix decision.
Also, neither Collins nor Phoenix considers the perspective of a
suspect seized by police officers acting under color of office. In Phoenix,
the defendants stopped the truck and capitulated to police officers
proceeding extraterritorially and using their status as police officers to
act.'
However, the Phoenix courts focused instead on whether the
evidence obtained by the Martin County officers before the arrest had
been obtained illegally under color of authority. 5 In essence, Phoenix
narrowed Collins's focus on the use of indicia of authority. Additionally,
while the Collins court appeared to predicate its ruling directly under the
Fourth Amendment, 2 6 Phoenix is predicated on Florida common law
deeming extrajurisdictional arrests to be those of a private citizen. z 7
An interesting means to understand the differences between the two
opinions would be to apply their respective rules to the facts presented by
the other case. Although the result might be the same, the means used to
obtain the result are plainly different. Thus, in applying the Phoenix rule
to the facts adduced in Collins, an imaginary suppression court would first
determine whether, prior to the arrest, police officers operating within
their jurisdiction lawfully obtained evidence implicating Collins, or,
whether, acting extraterritorially, these officers used the color of their
office to acquire damning evidence not otherwise accessible to a private
citizen.
In Collins, police officers interrogated a co-suspect who
implicated Collins in criminal wrongdoing. 8
Assuming that the
evidence established sufficient grounds for a private citizen's arrest, would
the Phoenix courts have found lawful the warrantless police entry into
Collins's motel room and the resulting seizure of evidence therefrom? A
definitive answer is not readily ascertainable. On one hand, a basis for a
negative response would probably be that a private citizen would not have
had the same access to Collins's room as would have a police officer
operating under color of her authority. However, this argument would be
inconsistent with both Phoenix decisions because it is likely that an
ordinary private citizen would have been in a less advantageous position
to stop the truck and to arrest the Phoenix defendants than were the
officers in that case. Also, a negative answer might result because of the
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Collins, 143 So. 2d at 703.
Phoenix, 428 So. 2d at 264-65.
Id. at 266-67.
Collins, 143 So. 2d at 703.
Phoenix, 428 So. 2d at 265-67.
Collins, 143 So. 2d at 701.
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illegal use of superficial indicia of authority to gain entry into the motel
room to arrest. Indeed, such analysis was rejected by the Phoenix
courts.259 Finally, the arrest could be considered unlawful because, by
using the authority of their office, the officers were able to uncover
incriminating evidence which was used to establish a basis for Collins's
arrest.'
A court subscribing to Phoenix would find this reasoning
palatable in light of Phoenix's rejection of arrests predicated on the
acquisition of evidence by officers acting under color of authority.
On the other hand, an affirmative response could be grounded as
follows. Since, prior to the arrest, the officers had lawfully obtained
enough evidence to arrest as private citizens, they should not have been
obligated to discard the indicia of their office to enter Collins's room and,
as private citizens, to arrest him therein. However, such a ruling would
also validate a police officer's extrajurisdictional warrantless entry into
and arrest in one's residence, a constitutionally significant act under
Payton v. New York. 1 Nevertheless, some language from Collins,
which permits a private citizen to "justify his failure to obtain a warrant
by proving the person arrested was actually guilty of [a] felony," 2
could place said conduct beyond Payton.
In contrast, a clear result would be yielded by applying the Collins
rule to the Phoenix facts. If a suppression court was to find that the
Martin County officers used the color of their office to arrest the Phoenix
defendants, the only concern would be whether they had a valid basis for
doing so, i.e, probable cause to arrest or some other justification
sanctioned by the Fourth Amendment.'
If they did have such basis,
then they could have effected a valid private citizen's arrest.
What makes the Collins rule more palatable than the Phoenix mandate
is the ease with which the former can be applied to either an arrest in the
home or on the street. Such application to the Phoenix facts produces a
clear cut result, and not the ambiguous one found in the application of the
Phoenix holding to Collins's facts.
Finally, one Florida case which addresses the execution of a warrant
by a police officer operating extraterritorially is San-Martin v. State.'
In this case, the Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District upheld
a trial court's decision to deny suppression of evidence obtained after
Louis San-Martin had been arrested pursuant to the execution of an arrest
259. See supra text accompanying notes 218-52.
260. Collins, 143 So. 2d at 702.
261. 445 U.S. 573 (1980); see also supra note 54 and accompanying text.
262. Collins, 143 So. 2d at 703 (citations omitted).
263. Id. at 703.
264. 562 So. 2d 776 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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warrant.'
On appeal, citing Phoenix, San-Martin claimed that the
arrest was not sanctionable because by executing the arrest warrant, the
arresting officer was "acting under color of authority."'
Noting that the officer was not in hot pursuit of San-Martin, the court
strictly construed Phoenix and found that the officer was not acting "under
the color of his authority" as a police officer. 7 According to SanMartin, Phoenix proscribes such assertion of authority only if used to view
unlawful activity or to acquire access to evidence not readily available to
private citizens.'
"The purpose of that Phoenix proscription was to
ensure that officers located outside their geographical jurisdictions are on
equal footing with private citizens in making arrests. While they should
not have any greater power outside their jurisdictions than do private
citizens neither should they have less such power."'
The court noted
that Collins sanctioned arrests predicated on probable cause with or
without a warrant, and that in the case at bar, the arresting officer made
a citizen's arrest based on a warrant or a citizen's apprehension founded
on probable cause embodied by the arrest warrantY
And, the
San-Martin court directly followed the Phoenix case holding that the mere
assertion of authority by a police officer proceeding beyond his bailiwick
when effecting an arrest is not an illegal exercise of his police power.27 1
Thus, the post-arrest search was valid because such searches are permitted
when made incident to a lawful arrest.'
San-Martin appears to address whether a police officer acting
extrajurisdictionally can execute an arrest warrant. However, the decision
does not indicate whether the arrest warrant was local or federal, or
whether it was issued by a court located within or without the jurisdiction
where the arrest was made. If the warrant had been a federal arrest
warrant, as was the case in La Fontaine, or was issued by a court having
jurisdiction over the place of arrest, then it was validly executed. 3 If
the warrant had been issued by another municipality or township from
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id. at 777. The court never indicated where the arrest warrant was executed.
Id.
Id.
Id.

269. Id. (citations omitted).
270. Id. Collins never directly addressed whether private citizens may executearrest
warrants. See 143 So. 2d at 703.
271. San-Martin, 562 So. 2d at 778.
272. Id. The basis for this ruling was New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)
(pertaining to post-arrest searches for automobiles).
273. 6A C.J.S Arrest § 53(a) (1975); see also Peoplev. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d
660, 668-69 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 3.120 (West 1994).
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Florida, the same result may hold, if the arrest is viewed as a citizen's
arrest founded on probable cause as embodied by the arrest warranty 4
But, if the warrant had been issued by another state and had been executed
by police officers from such other state, then it would have had no validity
in Florida, unless statutory authority indicates otherwise.'
Thus,
San-Martin's application of Phoenix failed to address this interstate arrest
scenario.
B. The "Under Color of Authority" Doctrine
Outside of Floridaand New York
Decisions from states other than Florida and New York also apply the
"under color of authority" rule.
Although not expressly referring to the rule, the Appellate Court of
Connecticut essentially used this doctrine in State v. Stevens.'
In
Stevens, a Stonington, Connecticut police officer named Diamanti
investigated a drunk driving incident in Stonington. m The driver of the
vehicle, Frances I. Stevens, after being arrested by Diamanti, was taken
to a hospital in Westerly, Rhode Island, which was nearest to the scene of
the accident. 8
At the hospital Diamanti administered Miranda
warnings to Stevens, performed two sobriety tests, advised her of
Connecticut's implied consent law, offered her the option to contact an
attorney, and secured her consent to a blood test. 9 Diamanti returned
the blood sample to Connecticut for chemical analysis.8'
Before trial, Stevens moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the
case, claiming that her arrest was illegal."8 The basis for the claim was
that Diamanti was not empowered to act as a police officer in Rhode
Island.'
The trial court denied the motion.'
The appellate court
upheld the lower court's ruling. After citing a litany of cases and
274. San-Martin, 562 So. 2d at 777.
275. 6A C.J.S. § 53(a); see also La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 668-69.
276. 603 A.2d 1203 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992), af'd, 620 A.2d 789 (Conn. 1993).
277. 603 A.2d at 1205.
278. Id.
279. Id. The officer administered a sobriety test and made observations of Stevens,
which led the officer to believe that Stevens was intoxicated. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
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the appellate court
principles pertaining to extraterritorial conduct,'
held that as a private citizen, Diamanti had the right to obtain the evidence
in Rhode Island.'
The import of the appellate court's decision is a discussion of
Stevens's due process claim. The court's analysis of this claim centered
on the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to Diamanti's actions in
Rhode Island.'
The court held: "[a]lthough he was no longer cloaked
with the official authority of a police officer when he entered Rhode
Island, it would be disingenuous to think Diamanti was not acting as an
agent or instrumentality of the police simply because he crossed the state
line." " The appellate court then found no due process violation.8
The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the judgment of the
appellate court. 9 The supreme court did not address the applicability
of the Fourth Amendment to the extraterritorial acquisition of evidence.
Instead, it found that crossing state borders did not preclude the admission
of the evidence at trial, and that Diamanti, though stripped of some of his
statutory and common law authority outside of Connecticut, did not cease
to be a police officer when enforcing a Connecticut statute in Rhode
Island.'8
Although the appellate court's decision did not invoke the "under
color of authority" doctrine by name, it can, nevertheless be viewed as an
"under color of authority" case with respect to the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment. Clearly, Diamanti asserted the authority of his office
as a Connecticut police officer to obtain the incriminating evidence in
Rhode Island. In so doing, the appellate court found him to be an agent
284. Id. at 1207-08.
285. Id. at 1208-09.
286. Id. at 1209.
287. Id. at 1210 (footnote omitted). The court followed the principle proffered in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971) holding that the Fourth
Amendment applies to private citizens acting as state agents. Stevens, 603 A.2d at 1210.
288. 603 A.2d at 1210.
289. 620 A.2d 789 (Conn. 1993). Two justices dissented on the grounds that
Officer Diamanti had no authority as a police officer in Rhode Island to order the
intoxication tests. Id. at 796-99.
290. Id. at 796. The statute is CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 14227(b) (1993) (Implied
Consent). Also, critical to the Supreme Court of Connecticut's decision was the fact that
the accident produced an emergency situation which required Diamanti to take Stevens
to the Rhode Island hospital. Stevens, 620 A.2d at 795.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

of Connecticut, thus rendering the Fourth Amendment applicable under the
state action concept. 291
Stevens can be directly compared to and distinguished from Phoenix.
Phoenix held that officers using color of authority while operating
extraterritorially to obtain evidence not otherwise available to private
citizens may not claim to have a private citizen's right to arrest based on
such evidence.'
Such arrests are thus invalid.'
Likewise, in
Stevens, the Connecticut appellate court recognized that Diamanti acted as
an agent from his jurisdiction, Connecticut.'
Stevens and Phoenix contrast, too. In Stevens, as was true in
Collins,'9 the assertion of a police officer's authority when operating
extrajurisdictionally while obtaining evidence does not render such conduct
illegal and also brings it within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment.m
However Phoenix would deem an arrest based on such assertion unlawful
if the same led police to evidence not readily available to a private
citizen. 2'
Unlike Connecticut's Stevens, Illinois' People v. O'Connor98
followed Phoenix. O'Connor entailed a police officer who was out of his
jurisdiction when he observed O'Connor speeding.'
The officer
pursued O'Connor into the officer's jurisdiction, arrested him and charged
him with driving under the influence of alcohol.'
Citing Phoenix, the
O'Connorcourt held that the officer did not observe O'Connor's speeding
by asserting the officer's authority as a police officer."° The court
reversed a trial court decision quashing O'Connor's arrest and suppressing
evidence derived from the arrest.m
291. See cases cited supranote36; cf Statev. Andrews, 637 A.2d 787, 791 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1994) (promulgating two pronged test to determine if an off-duty police officer
is acting in his or her official capacity: (1) The capacity in which the off-duty officer
initially confronted the situation; and (2) The manner in which the officer conducted
himself or herself after such initial confrontation).
292. Phoenix, 428 So. 2d at 266.
293. Id.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 287-88.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 124-49.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 287-88.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 218-52.
298. 520 N.E.2d 1081 (11I. App. Ct. 1988).
299. Id. at 1082.
300. Id.
301. ld.
302. Id.
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People v. Lahr is another case from Illinois that implicitly followed
Phoenix, but intended to confine its ruling to police radar cases.'
In
Lahr, a police officer in his jurisdiction conducted stationary radar
surveillance of a car driven by Lahr outside of the officer's
jurisdiction.'
The officer, who was in uniform, stopped Lahr's vehicle
with the officer's marked patrol car, and issued Lahr a traffic
summons.'
The trial court and an intermediate appellate court found
that the arrest was unauthorized under an Illinois statute authorizing a

private citizen's arrest.'
The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the lower courts' decisions,
noting that an extrajurisdictionally operating police officer has the right to
arrest as a private citizen,but may not to arrest if he has "used the powers
of his office to obtain evidence not available to private citizens."'
The
Lahr court concluded that the officer's use of the radar was an unlawful
exercise of his authority, but confined its holding to the use of radar
surveillance.' ° The court took great pains to distinguish itself from
O'Connorbecause in O'Connorthe officers used a radar to surveil a road
within the officer's jurisdiction.'
Also, although the government's case
urged that the supreme court adopt Phoenix, the court refused, finding that
Phoenix did not offer much in determining
310 whether the use of police radar
was an unlawful assertion of authority.
However, without admitting it, the Lahr court did adopt Phoenix's
teachings. As much as the court sought to confine itself to the use of
police radar as delineated in the opinion, thereby rendering Phoenix
inapposite, the court used exactly the same language found in
Phoenix." The only difference between Phoenix and Lahr, as the Lahr
court indicated, is that Phoenix focused on a police officer directly
303. 589 N.E.2d 539 (ill.
1992).
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 540.
307. Id. The court cited O'Connor, 520 N.E.2d 1081.
308. Lahr, 589 N.E.2d at 542.
309. Id. at 541. The court also distinguished its ruling from People v. Gupton, 487
N.E.2d 1060 (IUI. App. Ct. 1985), People v. Rowe, 471 N.E.2d 578 (Ill.
App. Ct.
1985), and People v. Marino, 400 N.E.2d 491 (11. App. Ct. 1980) on the grounds that
Gupton and Rowe did not address the pre-arrest acquisition of evidence obtained as a
result of extrajurisdictionally operating police officers using their authority and that
Marino did not respond to any defense argument that the extrajurisdictional arrest was
based on the illegal pre-arrest assertion of authority. Lahr, 589 N.E.2d at 541.
310. Lahr, 589 N.E.2d at 541-42.
311. Phoenix, 428 So. 2d at 266.
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imposing his authority on another person, while in Lahr such
"confrontation was subtle and indirect." Indeed, one dissenting judge
recognized that by implication the majority accepted the "under color of
authority" doctrine as promulgated by Phoenix.312
Without invoking the "under color of authority" doctrine by name, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has used it implicitly. In State v.
LeGassey,"3 the court applied the Fourth Amendment to a case entailing
an extrajurisdictional arrest by an off-duty state park ranger. The ranger
responded to an automobile accident in a truck bearing Maine's insignia
and a blue light.31 The ranger discussed the accident with LeGassey,
placed him in the truck, told him to remain there, and radioed the local
police for help.3" 5 LeGassey believed that he was under arrest and not
free to leave.3" 6 Local police arrived, administered Miranda warnings
to LeGassey, and obtained a confession from him. 3
A trial judge
suppressed the statement as being the fruit of an unconstitutional seizure
by the ranger.318
Maine's Supreme Judicial Court concurred. Citing a leading secondary
authority, the court held that the Fourth Amendment's applicability
depended on whether the ranger acted as a police officer or as a private
citizen.3" 9 The court held that the ranger acted as a police officer, thus
triggering the Fourth Amendment. 3'
Consequently, the arrest was
unlawful and the statement was excludable as the product of such
illegality.321
This analysis is similar to La Fontaine. In both cases
extrajurisdictional police officers acted in their official capacity and thus
violated the Fourth Amendment. The only true distinction is that La
Fontaine explicitly relied upon the "under color of authority" doctrine,
whereas LeGassey did so implicitly.
In a manner similar to the O'Connor court, the Supreme Court of
Michigan applied Phoenix to a case involving an extrajurisdictional
312. Lahr, 589 N.E.2d 539, 546 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
313. 456 A.2d 366 (Me. 1983).
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id. at 366.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 367.
Id.
Id. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.6 at 113, 133 (1978).
456 A.2d at 367.
Id. at 367-68.
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undercover narcotics operation. In People v. Meyer,3' the Supreme
Court of Michigan reversed a trial court's dismissal (which was affirmed
by the Michigan Court of Appeals) of an indictment charging Meyer with
violating Michigan's narcotics statutes.'
Central to the court's
determination was that the undercover officer did not exercise his
authority outside his jurisdiction to collect incriminating evidence.'
The Meyer court relied upon Phoenix and issued a succinct statement
about undercover officers acting beyond their bailiwicks: "An undercover
officer, by definition, does not obtain information through actions taken
under color of law."'
A case which La Fontaine followed, and which analyzed this issue
32 6 which was
similar to Collins and Phoenix, is State v. Filipi,
decided
by the Supreme Court of Minnesota more than two years before the first
Phoenix decision. Filipi involved an extrajurisdictional undercover
investigation which culminated in the extraterritorial arrest of Kenneth
Filipi and the warrantless seizure from his car of marijuana contained in
a closed duffel bag and the seizure of cocaine from his person. 32
Ultimately, he was tried for and convicted of possession of marijuana and
cocaine. 328
The Filipi court reversed the marijuana possession conviction, but
sustained the conviction for cocaine possession. First, the court
acknowledged that officers acting extrajurisdictionally have the power to
arrest as private citizens, if those officers are making an arrest under the
statute which provides for private citizens' arrests. 3' Second, the court
rejected Filipi's contention, based on Collins, that the arrest was invalid
because the officers acted "under color of authority." 3'
Collins was
distinguishable, the court found, because the police used the entry into
Collins's motel room to establish a basis for Collins's arrest, whereas in
322. 379 N.W.2d 59 (Mich. 1985).
323. Id. at 59.
324. Id. at 67.

325. Id.
326. 297 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1980).
327. 297 N.W.2d at 276-77. The officers involved in the investigation, which
targeted a suburb of Minneapolis, were from Minneapolis. Id. at 276. The Filipi court
did not indicate if the officers had the authority to investigate crimes in the suburb. Filipi
was pursued and arrested in Dakota County, an area beyond the officers' bailiwick. Id.
at 276-77.
328. Id. at 276.
329. Id. at 278. The court cited the Minnesota provision for private citizens' arrests.
MmIN. STAT. § 629.37 (1978).
330. Filipi, 297 N.W.2d at 278.
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Filipi,the police officers "while outside their jurisdiction, did not establish
the basis for their private citizen's arrest by using incidents of their
authority, e.g., badges and uniforms, to induce defendant to surrender
protections he enjoyed against private citizens generally. "'31 Finally, the
court held that the officers used their authority only after they established
a valid basis for arrest, and that the arrest itself was tantamount to a
lawful private citizen's arrest.332
Although the arrest was proper and the seizure of the cocaine from
Filipi's person was permissible as incident to a lawful arrest,333 the court
stated that the search of the automobile "was conducted under color of
police authority and the limits of the Fourth Amendment apply." 3 ' The
court held that the seizure violated the Fourth Amendment through
limitations imposed by335the United States Supreme Court on the
"automobile exception."
Filipi is significant because it seems to be
the first reported case which expressly applied the Fourth Amendment to
police activity conducted "under color of authority." The court did not cite
any authorities or supply any extensive reasoning for this holding. In fact,
prior to Filipi, the "under color of law" doctrine was a matter of common
law in states such as Florida, and not one of constitutional significance.
Finally, Filipi, with an assist from Collins, may have persuaded the La
Fontaine court to apply the Fourth Amendment to the conduct of the
extraterritorially operating officers.336
A further Minnesota "under color of authority" case is the recently
decided State v. Tlleskjor 37 In Tilleskjor the Minnesota Court of
Appeals held that a police officer outside of his bailiwick cannot first exert
his police authority to obtain evidence and then use it to make a private
citizen's arrest. 38
Tilleskjor struck down a police officer's
extrajurisdictional arrest of a suspect after the officer had used his police
authority to conduct an investigatory stop. 339 The court rejected the
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 279.
334. Id.
335. Id. The Filipi Court cited United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)
(holding that a search of a footlocker at a police station could not be deemed as a search
incident to a lawful arrest because it transpired long after Chadwick was in custody) and
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (requiring that a warrant was mandated to
search a suitcase which had been placed in the trunk of a taxi cab).
336. See supra text accompanying notes 45-53.
337. 488 N.W.2d 327 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
338. Id. at 331.
339. Id. at 328.
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government's claim that a private citizen's arrest power includes the right
to make an investigative stop because private citizens do not have the
authority to investigate crimes.' "
It appears that Tilleskjor followed Phoenix and Filipi, but raised a
very serious question: if private citizens do not have police authority to
investigate crimes, how can extrajurisdictionally acting police officers,
who are stripped of their police authority and are treated as private
citizens under these decisions, be granted such authority? The question
was never addressed in Phoenix, which purports to permit undercover
police officers outside of their jurisdiction to conduct investigations or
gather evidence so long as the same is not done through the exertion of
police authority. Tllleskior also did not answer this question. Tilleskjor
could mean doom for the Phoenix rule insofar as it applies to undercover
operations.
In State v. Williams,3" the Superior Court of New Jersey implicitly
applied the "under color of authority" doctrine to an extrajurisdictional
arrest, and focused on a suspect's perspective when confronted with such
authority. In Williams, uniformed Park Ridge, New Jersey Police Officer
Ruth responded to a report of a van without its lights on parked on the
side of a road. 2 Eventually, the van went into Montvale, New Jersey,
and was followed by Officer Ruth in his patrol car.' 3 In Montvale,
Ruth ordered the van to stop after seeing someone throw a beer bottle
from the passenger's side of the van. 3' Ruth searched the van with
Williams consent, and recovered a stolen license plate.' Williams
moved to suppress the license plate, contending that Officer Ruth did not
have the authority to stop the van.'
To counter this claim, the
prosecution argued that, as a private citizen, Ruth had the right to make
a citizen's arrest and to search the van. 47
The court deemed the prosecutor's position to be groundless and
concluded that "Williams believed he gave his consent for a search of his
vehicle to a uniformed police officer, not to a private citizen. The State
cannot therefore justify the stopping of the vehicle and subsequent consent
340. Id. at 331.
341. 347 A.2d 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975).
342. Id. at 34-35.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. The defendant apparently consented to the search, which was precipitated
by Officer Ruth's observation of beer bottles in the van's interior. Id.
346. Id. at 34. Williams noted that Patrolman Ruth was not in hot pursuit when he
chased the van. Id.
347. Id. at 34-35.
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to search on the basis of a private citizen's right to arrest."" 8 However,
the court denied the defendant's motion on other grounds. 4 9
Although the phrase "under color of authority" did not appear in
Williams, the decision used a rationale similar to Collins in rejecting the
notion that the arrest in this case was by a private citizen. In both cases,
the suspects permitted a police intrusion of their privacy because they
believed they were responding to police officers, not to private
citizens. 3"
Or, put another way, the officers' assertion of law
enforcement authority induced Collins to let the police into his motel
room, and Williams to consent to the search of his ear. 5' Accordingly,
both courts refused to accept the government's claim that the officers were
proceeding as private citizens.352
Graham v. State353 addressed whether an off-duty police officer,
acting under color of authority, was entitled to conduct a warrantless
search outside of Sapulpa, Oklahoma, where the officer was
employed.' 5 The off-duty officer observed an illegally parked car
outside of Graham's residence.355 The car was parked partly within
Sapulpa and partly beyond its geographical limits.35 6 The officer went
to Graham's residence, which was located outside of Sapulpa, to request
that the car be moved.3 57 The officer and Graham spoke outside of his
home. 5 When Graham tried to close the door to his home, the officer
smelled marijuana emanating from the residence.359 Without a warrant,
the off-duty officer entered the dwelling and seized a bag of marijuana,
which the officer described as being in plain view.4
Graham was
arrested for and convicted of marijuana possession.3 61
348. Id. at 35 (citations omitted).
349. Id. The police conduct was legal because the officer was entitled to stop the
vehicle because it was done on a road intended to be within the officer's jurisdiction by
the New Jersey State Legislature. Id. at 35-36.
350. Collins, 143 So. 2d at 703; Williams, 347 A.2d at 35.
351. Collins, 143 So. 2d at 703; Williams, 347 A.2d at 35.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

Collins, 143 So. 2d at 703; Williams, 347 A.2d at 35.
560 P.2d 200 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977).
Id. at 202-03.
Id.
Id. at 201.

357. Id. at 202.
358. id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 200, 202.
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The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals struck down the arrest
because the search of the residence was improper.362 The court ruled
that the off-duty officer was not authorized to conduct the search while
acting under color of authority.3"
Although a police officer acting
extrajurisdictionally may engage in the hot pursuit of a suspect, 3" or one
municipality may seek the assistance of another's police personnel, 315 the
general rule is that a police officer is not empowered to act beyond his
bailiwick and, thus, beyond his authority. 3
For several reasons Graham is distinguishable from other "under
color of authority" cases. Unlike Phoenix, Graham never confined the
"under color of authority" doctrine to a particular set of circumstances,
but issued a general proclamation barring police officers from acting
"under color of authority" while outside their jurisdiction. Also, in
contrast to La Fontaine, which viewed the doctrine as triggering the
Fourth Amendment, Graham's mandate is one of common law. In fact,
Graham never relied upon any authority in fashioning its "under color of
3 69
authority"
formula.3 67
Phoenix,36 La Fontaine
and
37
Commonwealth v. Troutman,
had offered a much more precise
definition of the "under color of authority" doctrine than did Graham.37
Another case from Oklahoma is Meadows v. State,' which
involved an extraterritorial undercover investigation."7
Law
enforcement from the county of arrest properly executed an arrest warrant
and arrested the suspect.374
The Court of Criminal Appeals of
Oklahoma upheld the officer's undercover activities as those of a private
362. Id. at 203.
363. Id.
364. Id.

365. Id.
366. Id.
367. See id. at 203.
368. 455 So. 2d 1024.
369. 603 N.Y.S.2d 660.
370. 302 A.2d 430 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973). For further discussion of Troutman, see
infra notes 377-86 and accompanying text.

371. Id.
372. 655 P.2d 556 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
373. In Meadows a police officer from Mustang, Oklahoma purchased narcotics
from Meadows in Oklahoma City, which was beyond the officer's jurisdiction. Id. at
557.
374. Id.
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citizen. The court found that the undercover officer did not "act under
color of law" and never held himself out as a police officer.375
Finally, in Pennsylvania's Commonwealth v. Troutman,376 two
police officers pursued motorist Troutman, whom they suspected of
driving while intoxicated.3'
During the pursuit, the officers went
beyond their Penn Hills Township jurisdiction.378 Outside of the
township the officers sounded their patrol car sirens and flashed their
The trial court quashed the
blinking red lights to stop Troutman. 3
accusatory instrument filed against Troutman because his arrest was
unauthorized. 3"
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial court's decision,
agreeing that officers have no statutory right to follow a suspected
misdemeanant beyond their jurisdiction.38 The court then held:
In the instant case, the Penn Hills Township policemen sounded
their sirens, flashed their lights, exhibited their badges, and made
the arrest pursuant to their authority as law enforcement officials.
The police officers' behavior was that of a policeman and not of
a private citizen. Once an officer invokes the power of his
township to make an arrest, he cannot preserve the legality of the
arrest by labelling his behavior a citizen's arrest.3"
Although not an expressly "under color of authority" case,
Troutman's language is similar to that found in Florida's State v.
Chapman,383 an "under color of authority" case. In both decisions,
arrests made by police officers using the superficial indicia of their
respective offices were not seen as arrests by a private citizen." The
375. Id. The court cited Filipi, 297 N.W.2d 275, to support the finding. Meadows,
655 P.2d at 557.
376. 302 A.2d 430 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973).
377. Id. at 431.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. Troutman was charged with a misdemeanor; the accusatory instrument
filed was an information. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 432.
383. See Chapman, 376 So. 2d at 264.
384. Id.; Troutman, 302 A.2d at 432.

19941

THE FUGITIVE IN NEW YORK

officers asserted their authority as police officers to make arrests and thus
their arrests cannot be construed as private citizens' arrests."
C. Distinctions Between La Fontaine and Its Predecessor Cases
La Fontaine... was the first case to regard the "under color of
authority" doctrine as triggering the application of the Fourth Amendment.
In contrast, most of the cases hold that the
doctrine is derived from the
39
Although Collins,388 Filii,389 and Troutman
common law. 3 17
are "under color of authority" cases, their approach was somewhat
different than La Fontaine's. For instance, in Collins, the court did not
expressly state that the Fourth Amendment applied to the police conduct.
The Collins court held that entry by police officers "acting under color of
office" had to be predicated on a valid basis in law.3 ' The court then
quoted the Fourth Amendment, and implied that such entry must be
permissible under the Fourth Amendment. 3" However, Collins confined
its rule only
to the entry and did not extend it to an arrest, as did La
33
Fontaine.m
Similarly, although the Filipi court held that the search of the
defendant's vehicle was conducted "under color of authority," and thus
was within the scope of the Fourth Amendment, the court did not view
385. Id.; Troutman, 302 A.2d at 432.
In Commonwealth v. Phillips, 487 A.2d 962 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), the court
considered an extraterritorial arrest made by a police officer not in hot pursuit. Id. at
963-64. The court applied 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8953(a)(6) (authorizing extraterritorial
arrest by a municipal police officer), which was enacted nine years after Troutman, and
upheld the arrest. 487 A.2d at 964. Under this statute, an officer under any
circumstances may effect an extraterritorial arrest if she has probable cause to believe
that a felony offense has been committed, and makes a reasonable effort to identify
herself as a police officer. Id. The court reached its determination without addressing
whether a police officer can make a citizen's arrest beyond her jurisdiction. Id. at 964
n.2. However, the court indicated that Troutman had been severely criticized by
authorities from other states and cited a number of cases seeming to equate a police
officer's extraterritorial arrest with that of a private citizen. Id.
386. 603 N.Y.S.2d 660.
387. See, e.g., Collins, 143 So. 2d 700; Filipi, 297 N.W.2d 275; Troutman, 302
A.2d 430.
388. 143 So. 2d 700.
389. 297 N.W.2d 275.
390. 302 A.2d 430.
391. 143 So. 2d at 703.
392. Id.
393. 603 N.Y.S.2d 660, 666-67.
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Filipi's arrest as deserving Fourth Amendment scrutiny."s9 Rather, the
Filipi court upheld the arrest as a private citizen's arrest on grounds
proffered by both Phoenix courts, that is, that the police did not exercise
their authority to establish the basis for the arrest.39 La Fontaine did not
apply this analysis.
Perhaps Troutman's rule is closest to La Fontaine's in that both cases
applied the "under color of authority" doctrine to an arrest by officers
However, unlike La Fontaine, the
asserting police authority."s
Troutman court did not apply the Fourth Amendment to the arrest, but
simply stated that it could not be validated as the activities of a private
citizen. 3 7
Finally, La Fontaine contrasts with Phoenix and its sister cases
because it applied the "under color of authority" doctrine only to the
arrest itself, and did not consider whether the New Jersey officers
operating extraterritorially exercised their authority to ferret out
In fact, in La Fontaine, the New Jersey officers,
evidence."' 8
presumably established La Fontaine's involvement in the crime while
acting within their jurisdiction and did not need to use their position as
police officers to establish La Fontaine's federal offense of crossing state
lines to avoid prosecution." 9 Thus, would a court following Phoenix,
have treated La Fontaine's arrest as one by a private citizen? The
response would necessarily have been yes because the New Jersey officers
did not use their authority extraterritorially to ferret out evidence or to
investigate suspected wrongdoing.'
D. People v. Marino:
A Criticism of the "Under Color of Authority" Doctrine
One case which issued a stinging critique of the "under color of
authority doctrine" generally, and specifically as promulgated in
Troutman, is People v. Marino." In Marino, Chicago police conducted
394. 297 N.W.2d 275, 278-79.
395. Id. at 278; Phoenix, 455 So. 2d at 1026.
396. Troutman, 302 A.2d at 432; La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 667-68.
397. 302 A.2d 432.
398. See Phoenix, 428 So. 2d at 266.
399. See Suppress Hr'g Record; see also La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d 660. There
was no evidence in the hearing record which would contradict this assertion.
400. See, e.g., Phoenix, 428 So. 2d at 226; Filipi, 297 N.W.2d at 278.
401. 400 N.E.2d 491 (I1. App. Ct. 1980).

19941

THE FUGITiVE IN NEW YORK

an extensive investigation of a burglary perpetrated in Chicago.'
The
investigation commenced in Chicago and culminated in Wood Dale,
Illinois, where the Chicago officers arrested the defendant and one other
suspect without a warrant and seized evidence after the arrest.'
No
Wood Dale police officers were involved in the investigation, arrest, or
seizure of evidence.'
Before trial, Madno' 5 moved to suppress the evidence obtained by
the Chicago officers.'
Marino claimed that his arrest was
unauthorized, and that the evidence obtained as a result of this impropriety
7 The trial court denied the motion. 40 8
should have been excluded.
Ultimately, Marino was convicted of burglary after a jury trial.'
On appeal, the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District found that
the Chicago officers had no statutory authority to arrest Marino beyond
their jurisdiction. 4" Nevertheless, the court upheld Marino's arrest,
holding "that a warrantless arrest effected by a police officer who asserts
official authority to arrest which he does not in fact have is nevertheless
valid if an arrest made by a private person under the same circumstances
would have been valid."4" Marino's arrest was valid under Chicago's
statute authorizing an arrest by private citizens.412
In making this determination, the court rejected Marino's claim that
the arrest could not be treated as that of a private citizen because the
402. Id. at 493. The investigation lasted eight days and involved 12 Chicago police
officers. Id.
403. Id.

404. Id.
405. Marino was tried with one David Wilhite, who was arrested simultaneously
with Marino. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 494.
410. Id. at 495. This finding was reached notwithstanding ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24,
para. 7-4-7 (1977), which the Marino court found to extend the authority of police from
municipality into adjoining municipalities within the same county. Marino, 400 N.E.2d
at 494. The reason for this statute's inapplicability was that Wood Dale, Illinois and
Chicago, Illinois were not adjoining municipalities. Id. at 495.
411. Marino, 400 N.E.2d at 497.
412. Id. That statute is ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1073 (1977). Marino, 400
N.E.2d at 497. The Marino court found that, under this statute, the Chicago police had
reasonable grounds to believe that Marino was committing a felony. Id.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 39

officers exercised nonextant official police authority to arrest Marino.413
Marino cited Troutman in support of this argument.4 14
The appellate court found that Troutman represented a minority
view. 415 More palatable was the majority view which holds that an

extrajurisdictional arrest by a police officer is valid if a private citizen had
the authority to make the arrest.416 The court cited several cases from
other states and federal cases that supported this view.417 In these cases,
an officer's assertion of the color of his office to arrest while operating
extraterritorially was irrelevant. 48" Rather, the dispositive issue was
whether there was statutory authority for a private citizen to arrest,
regardless of the capacity of the arresting officer. 419 Further, the court
cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which advocates a police officer's
right to conduct a private citizen's arrest regardless of whether she asserts
her office or whether the arrest is within her jurisdiction. 4

In conclusion, the court found that the Restatement's and the majority
views were better reasoned than the minority view and should be

controlling.421

Returning to Troutman, the court said that "[t]he

emphasis in the Troutman decision upon sirens, flashing lights, and
badges, is, in our opinion, superficial and we decline to follow the holding
of that case . . . . .
413. Marino, 400 N.E.2d at 495-96.
414. Id. at 496.
415. Id. at 497.
416. Id. at 496.
417. Id; see, e.g., State v. McCullar, 520 P.2d 299 (Ariz. 1974); Nash v. State,
207 So. 2d 104 (Miss. 1968); and United States v. Swarovski, 557 F.2d 40 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978).
418. Marino, 400 N.E.2d at 496.
419. Id.
420. ld. at 496-97. Specifically, the court focused on the following language:
In such a case, [a peace officer's] privilege to arrest is not dependent on his
being a peace officer; and it is immaterial whether he purports to act in his
capacity as peace officer or as a private person or whether he is or is not
acting within the territorialor other limits of his designation.
Id. at 497 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 121 (1965)) (arrest by peace officer
without a warrant) (emphasis in original).
421. Id. at 497.
422. Id. But cf.State v. Littlewind, 417 N.W.2d 361 (N.D. 1987). In Littlewind,
the Supreme Court of North Dakota, after noting the limits placed upon the "under color
of authority" doctrine by Phoenix, declined to "adopt" this doctrine, or, as the court put
it, the "Florida rule." Id. at 363. This decision not to "adopt" was reached upon
consideration of the case facts, which led the court to conclude that the subject police
officer was in hot pursuit when he left his jurisdiction. Id. The use of the term "adopt"
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Thus, Marino rejected the application of the "under color of
authority" doctrine to an arrest. In fact, both Phoenix courts took the
same action, but they also clearly indicated that they would apply the
doctrine to extrajurisdictional investigations or evidence gathering. In
contrast, there was no expressed willingness from the Marino court to
apply the doctrine to these phases of police activity. Arguably, Marino
rejects the doctrine with respect to any of these phases by its validation of
extrajurisdictional arrests regardless of the assertion of official police
authority and its repudiation of Troutman.
However, Marino did not forestall the Supreme Court of Illinois from
promulgating a Phoenix-type doctrine in People v. Lahr.4 '

Therefore,

the Lahr court permitted the application of the doctrine at least as to prearrest investigations, thereby addressing an issue not raised in Marino.4'
VI. THE UTILITY OF THE LA FONwAINE
APPROACH IN NEW YORK STATE

Although the "under color of authority" approach is not the majority
view 4" and was criticized by the Marino court as being superficial, 4"
the doctrine and its variation as promulgated in La Fontaine is most
consonant with New York State constitutional law principles.
Preliminarily, as indicated in La Fontaine, in the absence of federal
authority, state law must determine the legality of an arrest. 4' And,
since the motion to suppress in La Fontaine was brought under the Fourth
Amendment, state constitutional law was used to determine a Fourth
Amendment question. Such an approach is not unheard-of, because
federal courts similarly use state law to resolve issues raised under the
Fourth Amendment. 4"
was ambiguous, however. Did the court mean that it would not apply the "Florida rule"
to the specific case sub judice? Or, was the court saying that it would never apply the
rule to any case involving extraterritorial police activity?
423. 589 N.E.2d 539 (Il. 1992); see also supra text accompanying notes 305-14.
424. 598 N.E.2d 539. Lahr seemed to confine its ruling to the use of police radar.
Id. at 542; see also Marino, 400 N.E.2d 491.
425. See Marino, 400 N.E.2d at 497.
426. Id.
427. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d 660, 664 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993).
428. See, e.g., Swarovski, 557 F.2d 40, wherein local law was used to resolve a
question ultimately raised under the Fourth Amendment. In federal court and as to a
federal prosecution a motion to suppress evidence stemming from an unlawful arrest can
be brought in the first instance only under the federal constitutional law, i.e. the Fourth
Amendment. See id.
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In New York, Article I, section 12 of the State Constitution governs

the legality of an arrest. Although Article I, section 12129 shares similar
language and a common history with the Fourth Amendment, 4' the New
York State Court of Appeals has "delineated an independent body of

search and seizure law under the State Constitution to govern
citizen-police encounters when doing so best promotes "the protection of

the individual rights of our citizens.""' When this protection has been
sought, the Court of Appeals has remarked that Article I, § 12 is more
protective of State privacy guarantees than the Fourth Amendment with
respect to federal privacy concerns.432 In a period of Supreme Court
decisions often viewed as more supportive of law enforcement
concerns433 than protective of individual rights and liberties, it can
reasonably be said that Article I, section 12 emphasizes the primacy of the
4
protection of these rights and liberties over law enforcement concerns. 4
Consequently, when selecting a rule pertaining to extraterritorial arrests
by police officers not in close pursuit, New York State courts and the
State Legislature must be acutely mindful of this emphasis. And, the La
Fontaine rule, along with Collins's and Troutman's mandates and the

Colorado approach,435 is more protective of individual rights and

liberties than those extrajurisdictional arrest rules espoused by other
courts.

Before discussing the suitability of the La Fontaine-Collins-Troutman
rule, the reasons for rejecting the other formulae are proffered. First, the
PhoenixlFilipirule, which appears to represent the majority approach for
the "under color of authority" doctrine is to a degree more protective of
law enforcement concerns than private citizen concerns. This is so
429. See, e.g., People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474 (1992) (holding that unlike the
Fourth Amendment, which does not protect an owner of open fields, Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), Article I, § 12 does afford such an owner a privacy right
in areas outside the curtilage); People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434 (1991); People v. P.J.
Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296 (1986).
430. Harris,77 N.Y.2d at 438.
431. Id. (quoting Peoplev. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 304 (1986) (quoting People
v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 407 (1985))).
432. See also People v. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d 224, 228 (1989).
433. See Peoplev. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398 (1985)(rejecting underNew York State
constitutional law Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) "totality of the circumstances"
test to determine the validity of a warrant, and choosing to apply the more exacting
"Aguilar/Spinelli" rule). See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (promulgating a test to determine the validity of a
warrant based on evidence furnished by an informant).
434. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 666-67.
435. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
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because in these cases, the authority asserted by the officers did not
establish the arrests' validity. These cases only forbade the officers from
using the color of their office to obtain evidence establishing a basis for
arrest. Although the PhoenixlFilipiholding is consistent with safeguarding
individual rights and liberties with respect to pre-arrest investigation or
evidence gleaning, it does not go far enough to protect the rights of a
suspect at the time of arrest. At that moment, the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, the right to privacy, and liberty itself
are most imperiled. Indeed, in Phoenix, not only did Phoenix and his
cohorts give up their individual liberty when they surrendered to the
police, but also they surrendered their privacy interests in the truck which
they were driving. 4' And, while Filipi expressed its concern for Filipi's
privacy and Fourth Amendment interest in his privacy rights to the trunk
of his car and the container which was seized, the opinion did not display
such concern for Filipi's arrest, which vitiated his liberty, or for the
privacy interest in his person, which was searched by the police.437
Indeed, whenever an arrest is lawfully made, one's privacy interest in
one's person is always jeopardized because a lawful arrest allows a
warrantless search of the person.43 The same danger holds true with
respect to an automobile, seized pursuant to a valid arrest, in which a
privacy interest may also be found.439
The Phoenix test also does not consider police entries into one's
residence, in which a person has the greatest privacy interest, and entry
into which may trigger the application of the Fourth Amendment.'
Moreover, a police officer outside of his bailiwick who exercises the
authority of his office would be in a much better position than a private
citizen to gain entry in the home of an ordinary citizen and make a
warrantless arrest. The reason is that an ordinary citizen is probably more
inclined to submit to the authority of a person she perceives as a police
officer than to a person she believes is a civilian. Thus, should police
officers who operate extrajurisdictionally "under color of their authority"
and who threaten a basic and fundamental right to privacy in the home be
entitled to arrest as private citizens and have their conduct evade Fourth
436. Phoenix, 428 So. 2d at 264-65.
437. Filipi, 297 N.W.2d 275, 276-77.
438. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (authorizing under the
Fourth Amendment a search of the person if conducted as an incident to a lawful arrest).
439. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (permitting under the
Fourth Amendment a search of a vehicle's passenger compartment and any container
found therein if conducted as a search incident to a lawful arrest).
440. See cases cited supra note 54.
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Amendment scrutiny?" 1 Florida would say yes, if the basis for the
arrest was not obtained by officers acting extraterritorially and "under
color of their authority," despite the lack of parity between private citizens
and police officers who strive to seize a suspect and gain post-arrest
evidence. It is this disregard for a citizen's rights which renders Phoenix
and its disciple authorities from other states ill-suited to New York State
jurisprudence.
Plainly, undercover officers who conduct investigations or find
incriminating evidence do not imperil the constitutional rights of
citizens 2 because these officers do not reveal their identity as police
officers. Otherwise, however, citizens may be inclined to surrender their
rights to the display of the badge or the uniform or other identification of
authority." 3 To trivialize the significance of such police action, as did
Phoenix and Filipi, cheapens constitutional guarantees."
Finally, at least one decision may erode the precepts of Phoenix. It
appears that Tilleskjor's rule proscribing private citizens from claiming
police authority to investigate crimes could be extended to
extrajurisdictional police officers. 445 If some courts were to extend
Tilleskior in this way, what would happen to the Phoenix approach?
In like fashion, the majority approach as enthusiastically endorsed by
Marino, which determines the validity of extrajurisdictional arrests
pursuant to the law of private citizen arrests,'4 is inimical to New York
law. Such a rule clearly favors law enforcement interests because it
extends the authority of police officers outside of their jurisdiction,
thereby rendering the Fourth Amendment and possibly similar state
constitutional provisions inapplicable to such arrests under the state action
principle. Although law enforcement interests would be substantially
augmented if New York were to adopt the Marino approach, the rights of
New York's populace would be substantially diminished. New York is
committed to protecting individual rights and liberties above all else and
these principles would suffer if a foreign state police officer, operating in
441. See cases cited supra note 40.
442. See, e.g., Phoenix, 428 So. 2d at 264-65.
443. See, e.g., La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d 660.
444. Did the Phoenix court fashion a rule to achieve a specific result? By
deemphasizing the importance of displays of indicia of authority at the time of arrest,
Phoenix was in a position to hold expressly and impliedly that the Fourth Amendment
did not apply to the arrest by a private citizen. Consequently, the court ruled that the
police activity was authorized, unfettered by Fourth Amendment concerns, and that the
evidence derived therefrom was admissible.
445. See supra text accompanying notes 339-40; see also Tilleskior, 488 N.W.2d
327, 331.
446. Marino, 400 N.E.2d 491, 495-97.
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New York and holding himself out as a police officer and not as a private
citizen, could claim the same right to arrest as a private citizen and thus
erode the Fourth Amendment. Also, from a New York perspective,
Marino's argument that Troutman's analysis was superficial is itself
shallow, for it overlooks the real possibility that the assertion of police
authority at the time of arrest may necessarily induce the surrender of
cherished constitutional rights and liberties. 7 And, as is true with the
PhoenixlFilipirule, the majority approach does not address scenarios in
which police officers outside of their jurisdiction use their authority to
enter a residence without an arrest warrant to apprehend a suspect-a
Payton scenario.' However, such is not the case with the La Fontaine
rule. By applying the Fourth Amendment to the New Jersey officers'
conduct, the La Fontaine court ensured that La Fontaine received this
amendment's protection. Specifically, the entry into La Fontaine's
apartment, the most severe invasion of privacy, and the means by which
the officers arrested him had to pass muster under the stringent
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.'" And a court applying the
Fourth Amendment may apply the exclusionary rule.4' Although this
rule has been viewed as a prophylactic measure designed to ensure
compliance with a citizen's rights, and not as a right of a citizen,451 the
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is yet another means to insure that
a citizen's rights and liberties will not be regarded lightly by any police
officer.
The La Fontaine rule is also more flexible than Collins. Both La
Fontaine and Collins recognize that a citizen encountering a police officer
acting "under color of authority" responds to the officer as a police officer
and not as a private citizen.452 Both courts stated that the officer's action
However, while Collins
would trigger constitutional protections.4 '
limited itself to police entry, 4' La Fontaine imposed no such limitations.
The underlying flexibility of the La Fontaine rule is that it can be applied
to any citizen-police encounter, be it "on the street" or in the home.
Although the La Fontaine rule does not address pre-arrest
investigations or the ferreting out of evidence in New York State by
447. See supra text accompanying notes 414-24; see also La Fontaine, 603
N.Y.S.2d at 666-67.
448. See cases cited supra note 54.
449. La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
450. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
451. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
452. Collins, 143 So. 2d at 703; La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 667-68.
453. Collins, 143 So. 2d at 703; La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 667-68.
454. Collins, 143 So. 2d at 703.
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foreign state officers, this can easily be remedied by extending the
application of the Fourth Amendment to such conduct, if done so "under
color of authority." However, since undercover investigations do not
involve the exercise of such authority, they should not be governed by the
La Fontaine rule. Undercover officers should be allowed to conduct
investigations or search for evidence as private citizens in the same
circumstances.4 55
This view, consonant with Phoenix,456 would
simultaneously exclude evidence obtained "under color of authority" and
preserve the sanctity of undercover operations. 457 New York could also
follow the Colorado approach.458 Colorado invariably applies the Fourth
Amendment and the Colorado Constitution to all extrajurisdictional
arrests. 459 The only difference between the Colorado method, as seen
in Wolf, and La Fontaine is that Colorado concludes that
extrajurisdictionally operating police officers are not entitled under
Colorado statutory law to arrest as private citizens and that these
operations trigger federal and state constitutional protections.
In
comparison, La Fontaine expressly uses the "under color of authority"
doctrine to activate the Fourth Amendment."' The methodology is
slightly different, but the result the same. Or, New York could follow
LeGassey, which utilizes the same approach as La Fontaine, but which
differs only along semantic lines. 62
Thus, in New York, the rule should be that the Fourth Amendment
protects citizens against extraterritorial activity conducted by a foreign
state officer who is not in close pursuit, if such activity is conducted
"under color of authority." Such activity should include all pre-arrest
activity, arrests, and post-arrest evidence seizures. And, since this rule
is predicated on New York State Constitution Article 1, section 12, it
would determine the legality of such foreign state police action in New
455. See Phoenix, 428 So. 2d at 266.
456. Id.
457. See supra text accompanying notes 218-75. But what about Tillesjor and its
statement that private citizens do not have police authority and thus, the right to
investigate crimes, thereby calling into question whether extrajurisdictionally acting
police officers, stripped of their police authority, from claiming such right? See supra
text accompanying notes 339-40. And, should one confine Lahr's reach only as to prearrest radar surveillance or will other forms of pre-arrest surveillance be within the
decision's ambit? See supra text accompanying notes 305-14.
458. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
459.
460.
461.
462.

See discussion supra Part IV.A.
La Fontaine, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
See supra text accompanying notes 44-53.
See supra text accompanying notes 315-21.

1994]

THE FUGITIVE IN NEW YORK

York whether challenged under the Fourth Amendment or New York State
law.
VII. CONCLUSION

Prior to La Fontaine, at least 35 states had grappled with the legality
of an extrajurisdictional arrest by a police officer not acting in close
pursuit.'
La Fontaine considered the law from those states and
formulated a rule which appears to be consonant with New York State
constitutional concerns. However, La Fontaine was decided by a trial
court and, at most, offers persuasive authority to other New York State
courts. Until La Fontaine reaches an appellate court, or the state
legislature enacts a specific provision dealing with extrajurisdictional
arrests, or an appellate court addresses such arrests in other cases, La
Fontaine is all that New York can offer.
Waiting for further
developments in this area of New York's arrest law may keep the bar and
judges in the same state of suspense as were rapt followers of "The
Fugitive" who wondered whether Dr. Kimble would ever clear his name.

463. See Donaldson, supra note 63.

